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We present a general equilibrium model of the decisions of firms to innovate and to engage in international
trade. We use the model to analyze the impact of a reduction in international trade costs on firms' process
and product innovative activity. We first show analytically that if all firms export with equal intensity,
then a reduction in international trade costs has no impact at all, in steady-state, on firms' investments
in process innovation. We then show that if only a subset of firms export, a decline in marginal trade
costs raises process innovation in exporting firms relative to that of non-exporting firms. This reallocation
of process innovation reinforces existing patterns of comparative advantage, and leads to an amplified
response of trade volumes and output over time. In a quantitative version of the model, we show that
the increase in process innovation is largely offset by a decline in product innovation. We find that,
even if process innovation is very elastic and leads to a large dynamic response of trade, output, consumption,
and the firm size distribution, the dynamic welfare gains are very similar to those in a model with inelastic
process innovation.
Andrew Atkeson
Bunche Hall 9381
Department of Economics
UCLA
Box 951477
Los Angeles, CA  90095-1477
and NBER
andy@atkeson.net
Ariel Burstein
Department of Economics
Bunche Hall 8365
Box 951477
UCLA
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1477
and NBER
arielb@econ.ucla.edu1. Introduction
Over the past several decades, there has been a striking growth in the share of international
trade in output, both for the US economy and for the world as a whole. How has this
expansion of opportunities for international trade changed ﬁrms’ incentives to engage in
innovative activities?
In this paper, we present a simple general equilibrium model of the decisions of ﬁrms to
innovate and to participate in international trade. Motivated by the observation that there
is large heterogeneity in export behavior across ﬁrms even within narrowly deﬁned sectors,
recent research in international trade has modeled comparative advantage as an attribute of
the ﬁrm (see, for example, Melitz 2003 and Bernard, Jensen, Eaton, and Kortum 2003). In
these models, each ﬁrm has a stock of some ﬁrm speciﬁc factor that determines its current
proﬁt opportunities. Examples of this ﬁrm speciﬁc factor include productivity, managerial
skill, product quality, or brand name. Our model includes two forms of innovation: innova-
tion to increase the stock of this ﬁrm speciﬁcf a c t o ri na ne x i s t i n gﬁrm — process innovation,
and innovation to create new ﬁrms with a new initial stock of the ﬁrm speciﬁcf a c t o r—
product innovation. We use the model to study the dynamic gains from trade that arise as
process and product innovation respond to a decline in the costs of international trade.
We start our analysis of the impact of a reduction in the costs of international trade
on innovation with a stark analytical result. We show in our model that if all ﬁrms export
(so the ﬁxed costs of international trade are zero) then, in general equilibrium, a decrease
in the marginal costs of international trade has no impact at all, in steady-state, on ﬁrms’
process innovation decisions and hence no impact on aggregate productivity and output over
an above the impact of this trade cost reduction on the volume of trade and production in
a version of the model that abstracts from process innovation.
The intuition for this result in our model is as follows. If all ﬁrms export, a reduction
in the marginal costs of international trade changes the proﬁt opportunities of all ﬁrms by
the same proportion. The returns to process innovation are proportional to ﬁrm proﬁts, so
a reduction in the marginal costs of international trade also changes the returns to process
innovation by the same proportion for all ﬁrms. In general equilibrium with free entry, the
expected proﬁts of starting a new ﬁrm and the cost of innovative inputs must rise by the same
amount to ensure that there are zero proﬁts to product innovation. Because the reduction
in trade costs aﬀects the opportunities of all ﬁrms proportionally, this free entry condition
2implies that the ratio of the returns to process innovation to the cost of innovative inputs
remains unchanged for all ﬁrms. Hence, the equilibrium process innovation decisions are left
unchanged.
This result implies that when all ﬁrms export, our model has steady-state implications for
the impact of changes in marginal trade costs on product innovation closely related to several
existing results in the literature building on the work of Krugman (1980) and Grossman and
Helpman (1991). The models in this literature typically abstract from process innovation
within ongoing ﬁrms and focus instead only on product innovation measured in terms of the
introduction of new goods. Our result also echoes the ﬁndings of Eaton and Kortum (2001).
They ﬁnd the same result that changes in the costs of international trade have no impact
on innovative eﬀort in a model of quality ladders embedded in a multi-country Ricardian
model of international trade, with a research sector that produces new ideas randomly across
goods. Our result diﬀers from theirs in that in our model, process innovation is directed
toward reducing the ﬁrm’s marginal cost of producing a speciﬁc product and ﬁrms do not
compete over technological leadership in producing any particular product.
Our analytical result that changes in the costs of trade have no impact on ﬁrm level
process innovation holds only if all ﬁrms have equal exposure to opportunities for interna-
tional trade. In the data, however, ﬁrms vary greatly in their participation in international
trade – exports are highly concentrated among large ﬁrms. Here we build on the insight of
Melitz (2003) and add to our model a ﬁxed cost of trade at the ﬁrm level so that only the
more productive (and hence larger) ﬁrms choose to export. In this case, a reduction in the
marginal costs of trade leads in general equilibrium to an increase in proﬁts of exporting ﬁrms
relative to the proﬁts of ﬁrms that do not export. We show analytically in our model that a
reduction in marginal trade costs leads in equilibrium to an increase in process innovation in
exporting ﬁrms relative to that in ﬁrms that do not export. Hence, over time, this reduction
in trade costs leads to an ampliﬁcation of the initial reallocation eﬀects of a decrease in
trade costs – exporting ﬁrms grow over time and increase their exports while ﬁrms that do
not export shrink. In other words, this reallocation of process innovation ampliﬁes existing
patterns of comparative advantage and ampliﬁes the response of trade and output over time.
We then develop a quantitative version of our model and show that it reproduces many
salient features of the U.S. data on ﬁrm dynamics and export behavior. We use this model
to assess the impact of a reduction in the costs of international trade on ﬁrms’ innovative
3activity and the associated dynamic gains from trade. One challenge we face in making
our model quantitative is to infer how elastic process innovation eﬀort is to changes in the
incentives to innovate. If investments in process innovation are highly inelastic, then the
dynamic responses of exports, output, consumption and the ﬁrm size distribution do not
vary substantially from those of a model that abstracts from endogenous process innovation.
In contrast, if process innovation is highly elastic, then these dynamic responses can be
quite large. We examine our model’s implications for a wide range of this process innovation
elasticity parameter.
We ﬁnd two main results. Our ﬁr s tr e s u l ti st h a ti nr e s p o n s et oad e c l i n ei nm a r g i n a l
trade costs, the increase in process innovation is largely oﬀset by a decline in product inno-
vation, and these changes in innovation are larger the more elastic is process innovation.1
This result follows from the free entry condition governing the creation of new ﬁrms. In
equilibrium, prices and entry have to adjust following a decline in international trade costs
so as to leave the value of starting a new ﬁrm equal to the entry cost. To the extent that
a decline in international trade cost increases process innovation and hence productivity in
large exporting ﬁrms, it drives up wages and drives down the value of entrants, which tend
to be small non-exporting ﬁrms. Hence, entry falls to restore the free entry condition.
Our second result is that consideration of elastic process innovation does not substantially
alter the dynamic welfare implications of a reduction in international trade costs. We ﬁnd
that, even when elastic process innovation leads to very large steady state changes in export
volumes, output, consumption, and substantial changes in the ﬁrm size distribution, the dy-
namic welfare gains from trade are only slightly higher than the gains achieved with inelastic
process innovation. This ﬁnding follows because process innovation is an investment – the
long-run productivity gains that result from increased innovation require an investment of
current resources – and, in our model, the out p u tg a i n sf r o mt h i si n v e s t m e n tc o m eo n l y
slowly. We show in particular that the transition in our economy from one steady-state to
another takes a lot of time.
Our model is closely related to several papers in the literature. If we assume that ﬁrms’
process innovation choices are inelastic, then our model is a variant of Hopenhayn’s (1992)
model in which ﬁrms’ experience exogenous random shocks to their productivity. In this case,
1Baldwin and Robert Nicoud (2007) present a related result, but our ﬁnding diﬀe r sf r o mt h e i r si nt h a t
we ﬁnd that changes in process and product innovation largely oﬀset: the decline in product innovation is
larger the more elastic is the response of process innovation.
4our model is speciﬁcally an open economy version of the model of ﬁrm dynamics in Luttmer
(2006) and hence is quite similar to Irarrazabal and Opromolla (2006). Our inclusion of ﬁxed
and marginal costs of exporting also follows Melitz (2003) and Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and
Kortum (2003), among many others. We study such a version of our model as a benchmark
to show that it can reproduce many of the same features of the US data on ﬁrm dynamics,
the ﬁrm size distribution, and export decisions studied in these papers.2 One of the most
important of these features is Gibrat’s Law – the observation that, at least for large ﬁrms,
ﬁrm growth is independent of ﬁrm size.
Our model of ﬁrms’ process innovation follows Griliches’ (1979) knowledge capital model
of ﬁrm productivity, and the work of Ericson and Pakes (1995). The assumption that the
fruits of innovative activity are stochastic in our model means it can account for simultaneous
growth and decline, and entry and exit of ﬁrms in steady-state.3 Our model is also related
to Bustos (2005), who provides empirical support (using ﬁrm level data from Argentina) for
a model of trade and heterogeneous ﬁrms in which exporters choose to pay a one-time ﬁxed
cost to upgrade their technology. It is also related to the work of Costantini and Melitz
(2007), that studies how the dynamics of trade liberalizations shapes the pace of one-time
technology upgrading and productivity improvements across ﬁrms.
Our paper complements the work of Klette and Kortum (2004) and Lentz and Mortensen
(2006) in constructing a model of innovation that abstracts from strategic interactions across
ﬁrms and is also consistent with data on ﬁrm dynamics. While their framework is a quality
ladders model a la Grossman and Helpman (1991) where ﬁrms engage in undirected inno-
vation and their dynamics are governed by creative destruction, ours is a model in which
monopolistically competitive ﬁrms engage in product innovation and process innovation to
shape the stochastic process of their production cost.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model and Section 3 charac-
terizes the equilibrium. Section 4 describes the analytic result that if all ﬁrms export then
a change in trade costs has no eﬀect on the ﬁrms’ process innovation decisions and char-
acterizes the impact of a change in trade costs on product innovation. Section 5 examines
analytically the reallocation of process innovation that occurs in response to a change in
trade costs when not all ﬁrms export. Section 6 discusses the implications for ﬁrm growth.
2In related work, Alessandria and Choi (2007) study the welfare gains of trade in a dynamic version of
Melitz’ model that abstracts from process innovation.
3Doraszelski and Jaumandreu (2006) estimate a Griliches’ knowledge capital model in which innovative
investments within the ﬁrm also lead to stochastic productivity improvements.
5Section 7 presents the quantitative model and describes how we calibrate the model to match
salient features of the US data on ﬁrm dynamics and export behavior. Section 8 presents
the model’s quantitative implications for the response of innovation, output, consumption,
and welfare to a decline in trade costs, both across steady states and along the transition.
Section 9 concludes. An Appendix includes the characterization of equilibrium, proofs, and
solution methods.
2. The Model
Time is discrete and labelled t =0 ,1,2,....There are two countries: home and foreign. Vari-
ables pertaining to the foreign country are denoted with a star. Households in each country
are endowed with L units of time. Production in each count r yi ss t r u c t u r e da sf o l l o w s .T h e r e
is a single ﬁnal nontraded good that can be consumed or used in innovative activities, a con-
tinuum of diﬀerentiated intermediate goods that are produced and can be internationally
traded subject to a ﬁxed and a variable trade cost, and a nontraded intermediate good that
we call the research good. This research good is produced using a combination of ﬁnal output
and labor, and is used to pay the costs associated with both process and product innova-
tion, as well as the ﬁxed costs of exporting. The productivities of the ﬁrms producing the
diﬀerentiated intermediate goods are determined endogenously through equilibrium process
innovation, and the measure of diﬀerentiated intermediate goods produced in each country
is determined endogenously through product innovation. To simplify the presentation of the
analytical results in the paper, the benchmark model abstracts from ﬁxed operating costs
(that give rise to endogenous exit), and time varying ﬁxed export costs (to account for the
extent of ﬁrm switching between exporting and non-exporting status). These considerations
are introduced in the quantitative model in Section 7.
Households in the home country have preferences of the form
P∞
t=0 β
t log(Ct),w h e r eCt
is the consumption of the home ﬁnal good at date t. Households in the foreign country have
preferences of the same form over consumption of the foreign ﬁnal good C∗
t . Each household
in the home country faces an intertemporal budget constraint of the form
∞ X
t=0
Qt (PtCt − WtL) ≤ ¯ W , (2.1)
where Qt are intertemporal prices, Wt is the wage in the home country, Pt is the price of the
home ﬁnal good, Ct is the household’s consumption, and ¯ W is the initial stock of assets held
6by the household. Households in the foreign country face similar budget constraints with
t h es a m ei n t e r t e m p o r a lp r i c e sQt and wages, prices, and assets all labelled with stars.
Intermediate goods are diﬀerentiated products each produced by heterogeneous ﬁrms in-
dexed by z, which indicates their productivity. A ﬁrm in the home country with productivity
index z has productivity equal to exp(z)1/(ρ−1) and produces output yt(z) with labor lt(z)
according to the CRS production technology
yt(z)=e x p ( z)
1/(ρ−1)lt(z). (2.2)
We rescale ﬁrm productivity using the exponent 1/(ρ − 1) so that, as explained below, labor
and proﬁts are proportional to exp(z).
The output of this ﬁr mc a nb eu s e di nt h ep r o d u c t i o no ft h eh o m eﬁnal good, with the
quantity of this domestic absorption denoted at(z). Alternatively, some of this output can
be exported to the foreign country to be used in the production of the foreign ﬁnal good.
International trade is subject to both ﬁxed and iceberg type costs of exporting. The ﬁxed,
per-period cost of exporting in terms of the research good is denoted by nx.T h ei c e b e r gt y p e
marginal cost of exporting is denominated in terms of the intermediate good being exported.
The ﬁrm must export Da∗
t(z) units of output, with D ≥ 1, to have a∗
t(z) units of output
arrive in the foreign country for use in the production of the foreign ﬁnal good.
Let xt (z) ∈ {0,1} be an indicator of the export decision of home ﬁrms with productivity
index z (it is 1 if the ﬁrm exports and 0 otherwise). Then, feasibility requires that
at(z)+xt(z)Da
∗
t(z)=yt(z) , (2.3)
and that xt (z)nx units of the research good be used to pay ﬁxed costs of exporting.
A ﬁrm in the foreign country with productivity index z has the same production tech-
nology, with output denoted y∗
t(z), labor l∗
t(z), and domestic absorption b∗
t(z). Exports to
t h eh o m ec o u n t r y ,bt (z), are subject to both ﬁxed and marginal costs and hence feasibility
requires that x∗
t(z)Dbt(z)+b∗
t(z)=y∗
t(z),a n dt h a tx∗
t (z)nx units of the foreign research
good be used to pay the ﬁxed costs of exporting.
The home ﬁnal good is produced from home and foreign intermediate goods with a
constant returns production technology of the form
Yt =
∙Z
at (z)
1−1/ρ dMt(z)+
Z
x
∗
t(z)bt (z)
1−1/ρ dM
∗
t (z)
¸ρ/(ρ−1)
, (2.4)
7where Mt(z) is the measure of operating ﬁrms in the home country with productivity less
than or equal to z,a n dM∗
t (z) the corresponding measure in the foreign country. Production
of the ﬁnal good in the foreign country is deﬁned analogously. It will be useful below to
distinguish between the total measure of operating ﬁrms given by Nt = Mt(∞),a n dt h e
distribution of z across operating ﬁrms which has a cumulative distribution function given
by Mt(z)/Nt.
The ﬁnal good in the home country is produced by competitive ﬁrms that choose output
Yt and inputs at(z) and bt(z) subject to (2.4) to maximize proﬁts taking prices Pt, pat(z),
pbt(z), export decisions xt(z),x ∗
t(z), and measures of operating intermediate goods ﬁrms Mt
and M∗
t as given. Standard arguments give that equilibrium prices must satisfy
Pt =
∙Z
pat (z)
1−ρ dMt(z)+
Z
x
∗
t(z)pbt (z)
1−ρ dM
∗
t (z)
¸1/(1−ρ)
, (2.5)
and quantities
at(z)
Yt
=
µ
pat(z)
Pt
¶−ρ
and
bt(z)
Yt
=
µ
pbt(z)
Pt
¶−ρ
. (2.6)
Analogous equations hold for prices and quantities in the foreign country.
The research good in the home country is produced with a constant returns to scale
production technology F that uses Xt units of the home ﬁnal good and Lmt units of labor to
produce Ymt units of the research good according to Ymt = F(Xt,L mt). As is standard, the
equilibrium price of the home research good, denoted by Wmt, is given as a function of the
price of the home ﬁnal good Pt and the home wage Wt, by the unit cost function associated
with the production function F. We write this cost function Wmt = Wm(Pt,W t). Likewise,
in the foreign country we have Y ∗
mt = F(X∗
t ,L ∗
mt) and W∗
mt = Wm(P∗
t ,W∗
t ).
Intermediate goods ﬁrms in each country are monopolistically competitive. A home ﬁrm
with productivity exp(z)1/(ρ−1) faces a static proﬁt maximization problem of choosing labor
input lt(z), prices pat(z),p ∗
at(z), quantities at(z),a ∗
t(z), and whether or not to export xt (z),
to maximize current period proﬁts taking as given wages for workers Wt, the price of the
home research good Wmt, and prices and output of the ﬁnal good in both countries Pt,P∗
t ,
Yt, and Y ∗
t . This problem is written
Πt(z)= m a x
y,l,pa,p∗
a,a,a∗,x∈{0,1}
paa + xp
∗
aa
∗ − Wtl − Wmtxnx (2.7)
subject to (2.2), (2.3), and the demand functions
a =
µ
pa
Pt
¶−ρ
Yt and a
∗ =
µ
p∗
a
P∗
t
¶−ρ
Y
∗
t . (2.8)
8Productivity at the ﬁrm level evolves over time depending both on idiosyncratic produc-
tivity shocks hitting the ﬁrm and on the level of investment in productivity improvements
undertaken within the ﬁr m .W em o d e lt h ee v o l u t i o no fﬁrm productivity as follows. At the
beginning of each period t,e v e r ye x i s t i n gﬁrm has probability δ of exiting exogenously, and
corresponding probability 1 − δ of surviving to produce. A surviving ﬁrm with current pro-
ductivity exp(z)1/(ρ−1), and that invests H (z,p)=hexp(z)c(p) units of the research good
in improving its productivity in the current period t, has probability p of having productivity
exp(z + s)1/(ρ−1) and probability 1 − p of having productivity exp(z − s)1/(ρ−1) in the next
period t+1. We assume that c(p) is increasing and convex in p, and h is a positive constant.
In the next sections, we show that this form of H (z,p) allows us to obtain analytical results
for process innovation.
With this evolution of ﬁrm productivity, the expected discounted present value of proﬁts
for the ﬁrm satisﬁes the Bellman equation
Vt(z)=m a x
p∈[0,1]
Πt(z) − WmtH (z,p)+( 1− δ)
Qt+1
Qt
[pVt+1(z + s)+( 1− p)Vt+1(z − s)]. (2.9)
Let pt(z) denote the optimal choice of investment in improving productivity in the problem
(2.9). We refer to pt(z) as the process innovation decision of the ﬁrm. Note that if the
time period is small, our binomial productivity process approximates a geometric Brownian
motion in continuous time (as in Luttmer 2006) in which the ﬁrm controls the drift of this
process through investments of the research good.
New ﬁrms (or new products) are created with investments of the research good. Invest-
ment of ne units of the research good in period t yield a new ﬁrm in period t+1with initial
productivity exp(z)1/(1−ρ) drawn from a distribution over z given by G.N e wﬁrms are not
subject to exogenous exit in their entering period. In any period in which there is entry of
new ﬁrms, free entry requires that
Wmtne =
Qt+1
Qt
Z
Vt+1(z)dG. (2.10)
Let Met denote the measure of new ﬁrms entering in period t, that start producing in period
t+1. The analogous Bellman equation holds for the foreign ﬁr m sa sw e l l .W er e f e rt oMet as
the product innovation decision as this is the mechanism through which new diﬀerentiated
products are produced.
Feasibility requires that for the ﬁnal good
Ct + Xt = Yt (2.11)
9in the home country and the analogous constraint holds in the foreign country. The feasibility
constraint on labor in the home country is given by
Z
lt(z)dMt(z)+Lmt = L , (2.12)
and likewise in the foreign country. The feasibility constraint on the research good in the
home country is
Metne +
Z
[xt (z)nx + H (z,pt (z))]dMt(z)=F(Xt,L mt) , (2.13)
a n dl i k e w i s ei nt h ef o r e i g nc o u n t r y .
The evolution of Mt(z) over time is determined by the exogenous probability of exit
δ, the decisions of operating ﬁrms to invest in their productivity pt(z), and the measure of
entering ﬁrms in period t−1, Met−1. The measure of operating ﬁrms in the home country with
productivity less than or equal to z0, denoted by Mt+1(z0), is equal to the sum of three inﬂows:
new ﬁrms founded in period t, ﬁrms continuing from period t that draw positive productivity
shocks (and hence had productivities lower than z0 − s in period t), and ﬁrms continuing
from period t that draw negative productivity shocks (and hence had productivities below
z0 + s in period t). W ew r i t et h i sa sf o l l o w s :
Mt+1(z
0)=G(z
0)Met +(1−δ)
Z z0−s
−∞
pt(z)dMt(z)+( 1−δ)
Z z0+s
−∞
(1 −pt(z))dMt(z) . (2.14)
The evolution of M∗
t (z) for foreign ﬁr m si sd e ﬁned analogously.
We assume that the households in each country own those ﬁrms that initially exist at
date 0. Thus we require that the initial assets of the households in both countries adds up
to the total value of these ﬁrms
¯ W + ¯ W
∗ =
Z
V0(z)dM0(z)+
Z
V
∗
0 (z)dM
∗
0(z) . (2.15)
An equilibrium in this economy is a collection of sequences of prices and wages {Qt,P t,P∗
t ,
Wt,W∗
t ,W mt,W∗
mt,p at(z),p ∗
at(z),p bt(z),p ∗
bt(z)} a collection of sequences of quantities {Yt,Y∗
t ,
Ct,C∗
t ,X t,X∗
t ,L mt,L ∗
mt,a t(z),a ∗
t(z),b t(z),b ∗
t(z),l t(z),l ∗
t(z)} initial assets ¯ W, ¯ W∗, and a col-
lection of sequences of ﬁrm value functions and proﬁt, export, and investment decisions
{Vt(z),V∗
t (z),Vo
t (z),Vo∗
t (z),Πt(z),Π∗
t(z),x t(z),x ∗
t(z),p t(z),p ∗
t(z)} together with measures of
operating and entering ﬁrms {Mt(z),M et,M∗
t (z),M∗
et} such that household in each country
are maximizing their utility subject to their budget constraints, intermediate goods ﬁrms
10in each country are maximizing within period proﬁts, ﬁnal goods ﬁrms in each country are
also maximizing proﬁts, all of the feasibility constraints are satisﬁed, and the measures of
operating ﬁr m se v o l v ea sd e s c r i b e da b o v e .
A steady-state of our model is an equilibrium in which all of the variables are constant.4
In what follows, we omit time subscripts when discussing steady-states.
In some sections of the paper we focus our attention on equilibria that are symmetric
in the following sense. First, we assume that the distribution of initial assets is such that
e x p e n d i t u r ei se q u a la c r o s sc o u n t r i e sa td a t e0 and hence in every period. Second, we assume
that each country starts with the same distribution of operating ﬁrms by productivity and
hence, because prices and wages are equal across countries, continue to have the same dis-
tribution of operating ﬁrms by productivity in each subsequent period. In such a symmetric
equilibrium, we have Yt = Y ∗
t ,P t = P∗
t , and Wt/Pt = W∗
t /P ∗
t .
3. Characterizing Equilibrium
We start with an analysis of the static proﬁt maximization problem (2.7) for an operating ﬁrm
i nt h eh o m ec o u n t r y .A l lﬁrms choose a constant markup over marginal cost, so equilibrium
prices are given by
pat(z)=
ρ
ρ − 1
Wt
exp(z)1/(ρ−1), and p
∗
at(z)=
ρ
ρ − 1
DWt
exp(z)1/(ρ−1). (3.1)
The production employment of home ﬁr m si sg i v e nb y
lt(z)=
µ
ρ − 1
ρWt
¶ρ £
(Pt)
ρ Yt + xt (z)(P
∗
t )
ρ Y
∗
t D
1−ρ¤
exp(z). (3.2)
Note that (3.2) implies that there is a simple relationship between the productivity index
exp(z) and ﬁrm size measured as workers employed in production of output for domestic con-
sumption. In contrast, there is no relationship between productivity in the model, measured
as exp(z)1/(ρ−1) and standard measures of labor productivity. This is because the average
productivity of workers in the ﬁrm (measured as sales per worker) is given by ρWt/(ρ − 1),
and hence is constant across ﬁrms. Diﬀerences in productivity across ﬁrms in the model,
measured by exp(z)1/(ρ−1), are manifest in measures of ﬁrm size and not in measures of labor
4Since ﬁrms in our model grow endogenously through process innovation, there are parameter values for
our model in which a steady-state does not exist. Under such parameter values, the equilibrium has no entry
and a vanishing set of ﬁrms growing endogenously. We focus in the remainder of the paper on cases with
positive steady-state entry.
11productivity.5 Hence, ﬁrms’ innovation decisions, pt(z), together with the stochastic shocks
to ﬁrm productivity and ﬁrms’ decisions to export determine the dynamics of ﬁrm size and
the long run distribution of ﬁrms by size in our economy.
Home ﬁr m sh a v ev a r i a b l ep r o ﬁts Πdt exp(z) on their home sales, with
Πdt =
(Wt)
1−ρ (Pt)
ρ Yt
ρρ (ρ − 1)
1−ρ , (3.3)
and variable proﬁts Πxt exp(z) on their foreign sales, with
Πxt =
(Wt)
1−ρ (P∗
t )
ρ Y ∗
t
ρρ (ρ − 1)
1−ρ D
1−ρ. (3.4)
Therefore, there is a cutoﬀ ﬁrm productivity index ¯ zxt such that ﬁrms with productivity index
below ¯ zxt do not export and those with productivity index above ¯ zxt do export. Hence, we
have that ﬁrms’ static proﬁts are given by
Πt(z)=Πdt exp(z)+m a x( Πxt exp(z) − Wmtnx,0). (3.5)
The decision of a ﬁrm to invest research goods in improving productivity, if interior, must
satisfy the ﬁrst order condition
Wmt
∂
∂p
H (z,p)=( 1− δ)
Qt+1
Qt
[Vt+1(z + s) − Vt+1(z − s)]. (3.6)
This ﬁrst order condition must satisfy the obvious inequality if the optimal choice of pt(z) is
equal to either 0 or 1. We discuss the implications of this ﬁrst order condition (3.6) for the
impact of changes in the costs of trade on process innovation in the next several sections.
In Appendix 1, we describe the aggregate equilibrium conditions of the model.
4. Trade and innovation when all ﬁrms export
In this section we show that in an economy with no ﬁxed costs of international trade, once and
for all changes in the marginal costs of trade have no impact at all on the incentives of ﬁrms
in steady-state to engage in process innovation. This result holds in general equilibrium
because, in an economy in which every ﬁrm exports, the increased incentives to innovate
5Our model gives this stark result because intermediate goods producing ﬁrms choose a constant markup
of price over marginal cost. Note that the presence of ﬁxed costs of production, if counted as workers, can
only generate diﬀerences in value-added per worker for small ﬁrms. Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum
(2003) develop a model in which the markup that ﬁrms charge rises with size and hence measured labor
productivity rises with ﬁrm size.
12resulting from the increase in proﬁts that come from a reduction in marginal trade costs are
exactly oﬀset by an increase in the cost of the research good necessary for innovation. This
oﬀsetting change in the cost of the research good is required by the zero-proﬁtc o n d i t i o n
associated with product innovation. As a result, the optimal process innovation decision of
all ﬁrms is unchanged. We also discuss the impact of changes in the marginal cost of trade
on product innovation in the steady-state of our model.
We state our main result in the following proposition
Proposition 1: Consider two diﬀerent world economies, each consisting of two countries
as described above, with no ﬁxed costs of trade (nx =0 ). Let the marginal cost of trade
be D ≥ 1 in the ﬁrst world economy and D0 6= D in the second world economy. Then, the
process innovation decisions of ﬁrms in a steady-state in both economies are identical in that
p(z)=p0(z) for all productivities z.
Proof: First observe that if all ﬁrms export, then from (3.3) and (3.4), variable proﬁts of
home ﬁrms are directly proportional to exp(z) in that Π(z)=Πexp(z),w h e r eΠ = Πd+Πx.
The analogous result is also true for ﬁrms in the foreign country. In a steady-state, all
equilibrium prices and value functions are constant and the interest rate is constant at 1/β.
Hence, if we impose steady-state and divide the ﬁrms’ Bellman equation given in (2.9) by
the steady-state price of the research good Wm, we can re-write this Bellman equation as
w(z)=m a x
p∈[0,1]
Π
Wm
exp(z) − H (z,p)+( 1− δ)β [pw(z + s)+( 1− p)w(z − s)]. (4.1)
Standard arguments give that this Bellman equation has a unique solution w(z) correspond-
i n gt oa n yﬁxed value of Π/Wm. In addition, the solution w(z) is strictly increasing in
Π/Wm. We can regard the optimal choice of p(z) implied by this Bellman equation as the
optimal process innovation decision corresponding to a ﬁxed ratio Π/Wm of variable proﬁts
to innovation costs.6
Similarly, if we impose steady-state and divide the zero-proﬁt condition (2.10) by the
steady-state price of the research good Wm, we can rewrite this condition as
ne = β
Z
w(z)dG . (4.2)
6To ensure that this value function w(z) is well deﬁned, we need that for all p ∈ [0,1], either (i)
β (1 − δ)[pexp(s)+( 1− p)exp(−s)] < 1 or (ii) Π/Wm − c(p) < 0.T h e ﬁrst condition requires that the
expected growth of ﬁrm proﬁts is less than the interest rate. If this is not satisﬁed, the second condition
requires that the static proﬁts of choosing such a high growth rate be negative.
13We see from this scaled version of the free entry condition that the ratio of the discounted
expected value of proﬁts from starting a new ﬁrm to the price of the research good must
be ﬁxed at ne in any equilibrium in which there is entry. In a steady-state, the ratio of the
discounted expected value of proﬁts from starting a new ﬁrm to the price of the research
good is strictly increasing in Π/Wm. Thus, since there is entry in a steady-state, there is
a unique value of Π/Wm consistent with equilibrium. The equilibrium process innovation
decisions of home ﬁrms in steady-state are thus independent of the parameter D. Clearly,
the analogous results hold for foreign ﬁrms. Q.E.D.
Our proof of Proposition 1 relies on our assumption that all innovation activities use the
same research good. If diﬀerent inputs were required for product and process innovation,
then a change in trade costs might aﬀect the relative price of the inputs into these activities
and thus aﬀect equilibrium process innovation. Our proof of Proposition 1 also relies on our
steady-state assumption. In a transition to steady-state following a change in trade costs,
the interest rate and the ratio Πt/Wmt can vary over time and hence process innovation
decisions can also vary. Note, however, that this result does not depend on the functional
form for H (z,p). Note also that our proposition also holds if countries are asymmetric in
terms of all the parameters of the model including the marginal trade costs D and D∗ –
changes in any one country’s marginal trade cost leaves process innovation unchanged in the
steady-state.
What is critical for our result here is that changes in model parameters, such as the
marginal cost of trade, change equilibrium variable proﬁts in a manner that is weakly
separable with ﬁrm productivity (as indexed by z) – that is, these changes aﬀect prof-
its Π(z)=Πexp(z) only by changing the scalar Π. Because of this weak separability in ﬁrm
productivity, when the cost Wm of the research good adjusts to ensure that the zero-proﬁt
condition for product innovation holds, the ratio of the returns to process innovation to the
cost of the research good, as measured by pw(z + s)+( 1− p)w(z − s), is left unchanged
for all z and hence the equilibrium process innovation decisions are left unchanged. Given
this intuition, it is clear that in our model ﬁrm level process innovation decisions are also
unaﬀected if a country moves from autarky to free trade, or by changes in tariﬀso rt a xr a t e s
on ﬁrm proﬁts, revenues, or factor use that alter the variable proﬁtf u n c t i o ni nt h es a m e
weakly separable manner with z.
This logic implies that Proposition 1 would also hold in a two-sector model in which
14the aggregate outputs of each sector are imperfect substitutes and ﬁrms face separate entry
condition of the form (4.2). Speciﬁcally, assume that ﬁrms in each sector face no ﬁxed cost of
trade but face diﬀerent marginal costs of trade across the two sectors. Consider the impact
in steady state of a reduction in marginal trade costs in one of the two sectors. A simple
extension of the proof of Proposition 1 implies that in steady state, process innovation in the
two sectors does not vary with the parameter D. Here, we can think of (4.1) as the Bellman
equation for ﬁrms in each sector, with one Π for each sector. Using the same logic as before,
in steady state the ratio Π/Wm in each sector remains unchanged.
Our result in Proposition 1 that, in the absence of ﬁxed costs of trade, a reduction in the
marginal cost of trade has no impact on steady-state equilibrium process innovation implies
that adjustment comes entirely through changes in relative prices and product innovation.
Hence, in the absence of ﬁxed costs of exporting, our model has steady-state implications for
the impact of changes in marginal trade costs on product innovation closely related to several
existing results in the literature on the interaction of trade and innovation, building on the
work of Grossman and Helpman (1989, 91), Romer (1986, 90), Rivera-Batiz and Romer
(1991 a, b), Coe and Helpman (1995) and others. Our result implies that our model has the
same qualitative implications for product innovation in the steady-state as versions of these
other models in which the process for productivity in ongoing ﬁrms is ﬁxed exogenously.
Many of these previous papers considered the impact of changes in the marginal costs of
trade on product innovation in the presence of spillovers. One can introduce similar spillovers
from aggregate cumulative process and product innovation to the costs of product innova-
tion in our model in a straightforward way that preserves our result in Proposition 1. To
be concrete, consider versions of our model in which the productivity of the technology for
producing the research good is given by AF(X,Lm) where A is some measure of aggregate,
cumulated innovation. Examples of such spillovers include the stock of domestically produced
varieties (A =
R
dM(z)), or some weighted average of the stock of domestically produced and
imported varieties
¡
A =
R
dM(z)+µ
R
dM∗(z)
¢
, or the aggregate productivity of domestic
ﬁrms
¡
A =
R
exp(z)1/(ρ−1)dM(z)
¢
, or a similarly weighted average of the aggregate produc-
tivities of domestic and foreign ﬁrms
¡
A =
R
exp(z)1/(ρ−1)dM(z)+µ
R
exp(z)1/(ρ−1)dM∗(z)
¢
.
Clearly, our Proposition 1 can easily be extended to cover each of these examples because
the speciﬁc form of the technology for producing the research good did not enter into our
proof.
15We ﬁnish this section with a characterization of the impact of changes in the marginal
costs of trade on product innovation. For tractability, we focus our attention on equilibria
that are symmetric, as deﬁned in Section 3. We also assume, for the remaining of the paper,
that the production function for the research good takes the form:
F(X,Lm)=X
1−λL
λ
m . (4.3)
Here λ is the share of labor in the production of the research good. Note that if we set λ =0 ,
then our model has endogenous growth stemming from product innovation.
We now state our second proposition that describes a condition on the model parameters
under which a decline in marginal trade costs leads to an increase in product innovation
across steady states.
Proposition 2: Consider two diﬀerent world economies, each consisting of two symmetric
countries as described above, with no ﬁxed costs of trade (nx =0for all ﬁrms). Let the
marginal cost of trade be D ≥ 1 in the ﬁrst world economy and D0 <Din the second world
economy. If λ =1 , then the measure of entering ﬁrms in a steady state is equal in the two
world economies. If λ<1, then the measure of entering ﬁrms in the second world economy
is larger than that in the ﬁrst world economy (M0
e >M e) if and only if ρ + λ>2.
Proof: See Appendix 2.
The proof uses the following logic. We know from Proposition 1 that the ratio of proﬁts
to the price of the research good, Π/Wm, must remain unchanged across the two world
economies. Product innovation responds to ensure that this is the case. The precise response
depends on the parameters λ and ρ. Start with the case in which λ =1 . In this case,
Wm = W. Since, holding the number of ﬁrms ﬁxed, W changes one for one with Π when
D falls, there is no need for product innovation to respond since Π/Wm remains unchanged.
When λ<1, Wm = Wλ –w ec h o o s eP as the numeraire. Hence, holding the number of
ﬁrms ﬁxed, Π/Wm rises when D falls. Changes in product innovation restore the equilibrium.
Whether this requires an increase or decrease in product innovation is determined by the
elasticity of demand ρ relative to λ.
In the next two sections, we examine the response of process and product innovation to
a decline in marginal trade costs when not all ﬁrms export, due to the presence of positive
ﬁxed export costs. We ﬁrst present analytical results in a symmetric steady state. We then
present numerical results in a calibrated version of our model.
165. Trade and innovation when not all ﬁrms export
In this section we present analytical results on the response of process innovation to a re-
duction in the costs of international trade when not all ﬁrms export. To obtain these results
we focus on a symmetric steady state (see characterization in Appendix 1). We obtain our
results in two steps. We ﬁrst solve for the impact of a reduction in trade costs on the proﬁts
of ﬁr m st h a te x p o r ta n dﬁrms that do not export. We then solve for the impact of these
changes in proﬁts on process innovation decisions.
In our model with a ﬁxed cost of exporting, not all ﬁrms export, and hence, a change
in international trade costs in equilibrium reallocates variable proﬁts from non-exporters to
exporters in a manner similar to that described in Melitz (2003). To solve for this equilibrium
reallocation of variable proﬁts, we use the analog to the Bellman equation (4.1) describing
the value of an existing ﬁrm together with the free-entry condition (4.2). With a ﬁxed cost
of exporting, the Bellman equation for w(z) is now given by:
w(z)=m a x
p∈[0,1]
Πd/Wm exp(z)+m a x
©
Πd/WmD
1−ρ exp(z) − nx,0
ª
(5.1)
−hexp(z)c(p)+( 1− δ)β [pw(z + s)+( 1− p)w(z − s)].
Here, the ﬁrst term denotes static variable proﬁts from the ﬁrm’s domestic operations, and
the second term denotes the proﬁts from exporting (with symmetric countries Πx = ΠdD1−ρ).
The free entry condition (4.2) is unchanged. Clearly, this value function w(z) is decreasing
in both D and nx, and increasing in Πd/Wm.
We use this Bellman equation (5.1) and free-entry condition (4.2) to determine the im-
pact of changes in trade costs on variable proﬁts in equilibrium. Consider ﬁrst the impact
of a decline in the marginal cost of trade, D,o nv a r i a b l ep r o ﬁts (rescaled by the cost of the
research good) Πd/Wm. Since this raises D1−ρ, Πd/Wm has to fall in equilibrium to restore
the free entry condition. Note as well that
Πd
WmD1−ρ must rise if the free entry condition is
to be satisﬁed. Hence, for ﬁrms that do not switch export status, the proﬁts of exporters —
proportional to Πd/Wm(1 + D1−ρ),m u s tr i s er e l a t i v et ot h ep r o ﬁts of non exporters. Like-
wise, now consider the impact of a decline in the ﬁxed cost of exporting nx on variable proﬁts
Πd/Wm. Because w(z) is decreasing in nx, such a reduction in this ﬁxed trade cost must lead
to a reduction in variable proﬁts Πd/Wm to restore the free entry condition. This implies
that the variable proﬁts of all ﬁrms that do not switch export status must fall proportionally.
17In both cases, the export threshold falls so that some ﬁrms that previously did not export
now start to export.
Note that the magnitude of the decline in Πd/Wm in response to a decline in international
trade costs is determined in large part by the distribution G of productivities of newly
entering ﬁrms. Consider a decline in marginal trade costs D. If newly created ﬁrms tend to
be small non-exporters, then free entry requires that the discounted expected value of proﬁts
of these ﬁrms remain roughly constant. In this case, Πd/Wm remains roughly constant and
the proﬁts of for large exporting ﬁrms, Πd/Wm (1 + D1−ρ) rises by roughly the change in
(1 + D1−ρ). In contrast, if newly created ﬁrms tend to be large exporting ﬁrms, then free
entry requires that Πd/Wm (1 + D1−ρ) remains roughly constant, and Πd/Wm falls.
We now examine the impact of these equilibrium changes in variable proﬁts on the level
of process innovation. To do so, we solve for the process innovation decisions p(z) in (5.1) as
a function of variable proﬁts Πd/Wm and the other parameters of the model. The Bellman
equation (5.1) is a standard problem of valuing the proﬁts of the ﬁrm together with an
option: the option to start exporting. We use our functional form for the process innovation
cost function H(z,p)=hexp(z)c(p) to obtain the following lemma, proved in the appendix,
regarding the shape of the value function w(z) and the process innovation decision p(z).
Lemma 1: The value function w(z) that solves (5.1) has the form w(z)=A(z)exp(z)
with limz→∞ A(z)=Ax and limz→−∞ A(z)=Ad,a n dt h eo p t i m a lp(z) has limz→∞ p(z)=¯ px
and limz→−∞ p(z)=¯ pd where Ad and ¯ pd solve
Ad =
Πd/Wm − hc(¯ pd)
1 − (1 − δ)β [¯ pd exp(s)+( 1− ¯ pd)exp(−s)]
, (5.2)
hc
0(¯ pd)=( 1− δ)βAd [exp(s) − exp(−s)], (5.3)
and Ax and ¯ px solve these two equations with the term Πd/Wm in (5.2) replaced with
Πd/Wm(1 + D1−ρ). These solutions have Ax >A d and ¯ px > ¯ pd. Moreover, Ad,A x and ¯ pd
and ¯ px are increasing in Πd/Wm,w h i l eAx and ¯ px are decreasing in D.
Proof: See Appendix 3.
This lemma implies that for very small ﬁrms, the process innovation decision p(z) is con-
stant at ¯ pd. These ﬁrms do not export and all grow at the constant rate [¯ pd exp(s)+( 1− ¯ pd)exp(−s)]
in expectation. Likewise, for very large ﬁrms, the process innovation decision p(z) is constant
at ¯ px. These ﬁrms do export and all grow at the constant rate [¯ px exp(s)+( 1− ¯ px)exp(−s)]
in expectation. The intuition for how Ai and ¯ pi change with changes in proﬁts is then
18straightforward. If variable proﬁts Πd/Wmexp(z) or Πd/Wm(1 + D1−ρ)exp(z) rise, this
raises the spread between the value of a ﬁrm that successfully innovates to z + s relative to
the same ﬁrm that fails to innovate and falls to z −s. This increased spread in proﬁts raises
the incentives to engage in process innovation.
Note that the responsiveness of very large and very small ﬁrms’ process innovation deci-
sions ¯ px and ¯ pd to changes in variable proﬁts and marginal trade costs is determined by the
curvature of the innovation cost function as indexed by c00(p)/c0(p). In particular, because
the process innovation choice is optimal, ∂Ai/∂¯ pi =0 , and hence the change in steady state
process innovation with a change in proﬁts is given by
d¯ pd =
c0(pd)
c00(¯ pd)
d(Πd/Wm)
Πd/Wm − hc(¯ pd)
and d¯ px =
c0(px)
c00(¯ px)
d(Πd (1 + D1−ρ)/Wm)
Πd (1 + D1−ρ)/Wm − hc(¯ px)
. (5.4)
If c00(·)/c0 (·) is very large, then process innovation decisions and ﬁrm growth rates are not
very responsive to changes in proﬁts, while if this curvature is small, then innovation decisions
and ﬁrm growth rates are very responsive to changes in proﬁts. By a similar argument, this
curvature of the innovation cost function c00(·)/c0 (·) also controls the diﬀerence in the process
innovation decisions and implied growth rates of very large ﬁrms (¯ px) and very small ﬁrms
(¯ pd) in a steady-state.
With this lemma, we have the following results regarding the impact of changes in trade
costs on the process innovation decisions of very large ﬁrms (exporters) and very small ﬁrms
(non-exporters). A reduction in the marginal costs of trade D leads to a reduction in the
process innovation of very small ﬁrms and an increase in the process innovation of very large
ﬁrms relative to very small ﬁrms. This result follows directly from the fact that a reduction
in the marginal costs of trade reduces Πd/Wm and increases Πd/Wm (1 + D1−ρ) relative to
Πd/Wm. The extent of reallocation of process innovation from non-exporters to exporters
depends in part on the size distribution of newly created ﬁrms. If newly created ﬁrms are
small, then Πd/Wm(1 + D1−ρ) increases and process innovation in very large ﬁrms rises in
absolute terms while Πd/Wm remains roughly constant leaving process innovation in small
ﬁrms roughly unchanged. Conversely, if newly created ﬁrms are large exporting ﬁrms, then
proﬁts Πd/Wm(1 + D1−ρ) and process innovation in these ﬁrms remains roughly unchanged,
while for small ﬁrms proﬁts and process innovation falls.
In contrast, a reduction in the ﬁxed costs of trade, by lowering the equilibrium level of
variable proﬁts Πd/Wm, leads to a reduction in process innovation in both very large and
19very small ﬁrms (note that these ﬁrms do not switch export status). Similar arguments give
that a decline in the entry cost ne results in a decline in process innovation for both very
large and very small ﬁrms.
We have shown analytical results for the impact of a reduction in the costs of international
trade on process innovation in a symmetric steady state when not all ﬁrms export. In our
quantitative work, we are interested in the implications of a reduction in trade costs for
product innovation and for the transition dynamics of trade and output and for welfare. To
work out these implications, we solve the model numerically. We also use our quantitative
model below to examine the implications of a reduction in trade costs in an asymmetric
two-country world economy.
6. Implications for Firm Growth
Recall that in our model, each ﬁrms’ domestic employment, sales, and variable proﬁts are
all directly proportional to exp(z). Thus, our model of process innovation within ﬁrms has
sharp implications for patterns of ﬁrm growth. Speciﬁcally, since a ﬁrm with current size
determined by exp(z) has an expected growth rate conditional on survival of exp(s)p(z)+
exp(−s)(1−p(z)), the relationship between ﬁrm size and ﬁrm growth implied by our model
is given by the equilibrium process innovation decisions p(z). We discuss this relationship
between process innovation and ﬁrm growth in this section.
T h eo b s e r v a t i o nk n o w na sG i b r a t ’ sL a w–t h a tﬁrm growth rates are independent of
ﬁrm size, at least for large enough ﬁrms – is a robust empirical ﬁnding.7 Following Luttmer
(2006), we can show that if all ﬁrms were to exogenously choose a constant value of p(z)=¯ p
for process innovation, then our model would reproduce Gibrat’s Law. In proving Lemma
1, we showed that in our model very large ﬁrms endogenously choose a constant value of
p(z)=¯ px, so it is straightforward to show that our model replicates Gibrat’s Law, at least
for large ﬁrms.
This ﬁnding that our model can replicate Gibrat’s Law depends on our parametric as-
sumption that the process innovation cost function has the form H(z,p)=hexp(z)c(p).I n
Lemma 1, in proving that process innovation is constant for very large ﬁrms, we use the
assumption that the costs of innovation scale with ﬁrm size (through exp(z)) in the same
way as do the incentives to innovate. Speciﬁcally, dividing both sides of (3.6) by the price of
7For references on Gibrat’s law, see Sutton (1997) and Caves (1998).
20the research good Wmt gives that in steady-state, the ﬁrst order condition governing process
innovation is given by
∂
∂p
H (z,p)=( 1− δ)β [w(z + s) − w(z − s)] (6.1)
With our parametric assumption on H, since w(z)=Ax exp(z) for large ﬁrms, this optimality
condition reduces to (5.3) with constant p(z)=¯ px.
We refer to the term (w(z + s) − w(z − s))/exp(z) in (6.1) as the scaled incentive to
innovate as it is directly proportional to the ratio of the returns to increasing the probability
of advancing the productivity index from z to z + s to the scaling cost exp(z) of doing
so for a ﬁrm with current productivity index z. The results in Lemma 1 imply that in a
symmetric steady-state, the scaled incentive to innovate is given by Ad (exp(s) − exp(−s))
for very small ﬁrms and Ax (exp(s) − exp(−s)) for very large ﬁrms.
Our model fails to reproduce Gibrat’s Law for large ﬁrms if we chose a common alternative
scaling assumption for the innovation investment cost function. In particular, assume that
the costs of innovation scale with the productivity rather than the size of the ﬁrm so that
H(z,p)=hexp(z)1/(ρ−1)c(p). This scaling assumption follows naturally if one assumes that
productivity of the ﬁrm exp(z)
1/(ρ−1) is modeled as a capital stock to be accumulated within
the ﬁrm as in the Griliches knowledge capital model (see, for example, Griliches and Klette
2000). This assumption, however, implies that ﬁrm growth is increasing in ﬁrm size. This is
because the proﬁts that provide the incentive to innovate are directly proportional to ﬁrm
size, exp(z). But, with this alternative innovation cost function, the cost of innovation grows
more slowly than ﬁrm size as long as the elasticity of demand ρ>2. Hence, this alternative
speciﬁcation of innovation investment costs cannot be consistent with Gibrat’s Law over a
wide range of ﬁrm sizes for suﬃciently high demand elasticities.
Our model also fails to reproduce Gibrat’s Law over the full range of ﬁrm sizes because, as
we showed in Lemma 1, very large ﬁr m se x p o r ta n dh e n c eh a v eah i g h e ri n c e n t i v et oe n g a g ei n
process innovation relative to their domestic employment (which is proportional to exp(z))
than very small ﬁrms. In particular, in Lemma 1, we showed that the constant process
innovation decision for large ﬁrms ¯ px is larger than the constant process innovation for very
small ﬁrms ¯ pd. Our model can generate the same constant process innovation decision for
very small and very large ﬁrms if we assume that process innovation costs scale with total
employment within the ﬁrm rather than with exp(z). With this assumption, in a symmetric
steady-state process innovation costs would have the form H(z,p)=hexp(z)c(p) for very
21small ﬁrms and H(z,p)=hexp(z)c(p)(1+D1−ρ) for very large ﬁrms. We show below in
our quantitative section that with this assumption, there is very little reallocation of process
innovation in response to a decline in the marginal costs of trade.
As we have discussed, our model implies diﬀerent process innovation decisions and hence
diﬀerent growth rates for very small and very large ﬁrms, as well as a reallocation of process
innovation, and hence ﬁrm growth rates, from small non-exporting ﬁrms to large exporting
ﬁrms, in response to a decline in the marginal costs of trade. From (5.4), we see that in
a symmetric steady-state, the magnitude of these eﬀects on the process innovation decision
depends in an important way on the curvature of the innovation cost function as measured
by c00(p)/c0(p). In our quantitative work below, we assume that this cost function has the
form exp(bp) so that this curvature is indexed by the parameter b. If this parameter b is high
(low), so that this curvature is high (low), then from (5.4) we have that the steady-state
diﬀerences in growth rates of very small and very large ﬁrms as well as the reallocation of
process innovation across ﬁrms in response to a change in trade costs are quantitatively small
(large).
In our quantitative work, we consider alternative values of b ranging from very large
(b = 3000) in which the process innovation decisions of ﬁrms are highly inelastic and hence
eﬀectively constant as in the model of Luttmer (2006) to lower values of b (b =3 0and
b =1 0 ) , in which process innovation decisions are elastic and vary substantially across ﬁrms
in diﬀerent size classes in steady-state, and in which the change in the steady-state ﬁrm size
distribution following a change in trade costs is quite large.
7. Quantitative Analysis
We now present a quantitative version of our model that is consistent with many features
of the data on ﬁrm size dynamics (both in terms of employment and export status), and
the ﬁrm size distribution in the U.S. economy. We then use that model to examine the
quantitative impact of a change in the costs of international trade on output and the volume
of trade in both the short and the long run, as well as on the product and process innovative
activity of individual ﬁrms. We also use the model to compute the welfare implications of
this reallocation of innovative activities.
Our quantitative model extends the model described above in two ways. First, we assume
that production requires nf units of the research good during each period t as a ﬁxed cost
22of production. This ﬁxed cost is denominated in terms of the research good, and gives rise
to endogenous exit. In particular, only ﬁrms with a productivity index z above a certain
threshold (that can change over time) decide to operate every period, while those with
productivity index below this threshold choose to exit and receive a value of zero. We ﬁnd
below that consideration of endogenous exit has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the process innovation
decisions of small ﬁr m s .T h i sa r i s e sf r o mt h eo p t i o nt oe x i t .G i v e nt h a tt h ev a l u eo fe x i ti s
independent of z, the scaled incentive to innovate is smaller for these ﬁrms relative to others
that have high values of z and hence are far from exiting.
Second, we assume that the ﬁxed cost of exporting is random and i.i.d. over time for each
ﬁrm. Each period, the ﬁrm draws a random ﬁxed cost of exporting nx from a distribution
Gx that is lognormal with mean ¯ nx and variance σ2
nx (σnx =0 , corresponds to a constant
ﬁxed cost of exporting). This model generates heterogeneity in export behavior for ﬁrms
with equal z but diﬀerent ﬁxed cost of exporting. The variable xt(z) ∈ [0,1] now indicates
the fraction of home ﬁrms with productivity index z that export any output at all at time
t.W i t hσnx > 0, so that the ﬁxed costs of exporting are random, ﬁrms switch status from
exporting to not exporting and vice-versa more frequently the larger is σnx. We use data
on the fraction of employment in ﬁrms that switch status from exporting to not exporting,
and vice versa, in our calibration. Further details of the extended model are provided in
Appendix 1. It is straightforward to see that Propositions 1 and 2 presented in Section 4
also hold in this extended model.
Calibration
We now discuss how the model is parameterized to reproduce a number of salient features
of U.S. data on ﬁrms dynamics, the ﬁrm size distribution, and international trade. We choose
time periods equal to two months so there are six time periods per year.8 We parameterize
the distribution G of productivity draws of entrants to be normal so that for entering ﬁrms,
z ∼ N(0,σe). We parameterize the distribution of ﬁxed costs of exporting so that log(nx) ∼
N(log(¯ nx) − σ2
nx/2,σ nx) – the mean of nx is ¯ nx.
T h ep a r a m e t e r so ft h em o d e lt h a tw em u s tc h o o s et h e na r et h es t e a d y - s t a t ei n t e r e s t
rate given by 1/β, the total number of workers L, the parameters governing the variance of
employment growth for surviving ﬁrms s, the exogenous exit rate of ﬁrms δ,t h eﬁxed costs
8As we reduce the period length, we keep the entry period of new ﬁrms at one year. Otherwise, the
allocations would change signiﬁcantly as the cost of waiting for a new draw (and hence the entry threshold
¯ z ) would decline.
23of operation nf and entry ne, the parameters of the innovation cost function h and b, the
parameter of the distribution of initial productivity draws for ﬁrms σe, the parameters of
the distribution of ﬁxed costs of exporting ¯ nx and σnx, and the export intensity of exporting
ﬁrms D1−ρ/(1+D1−ρ). We also need to choose the elasticity of substitution ρ, and the share
of labor in the production of research goods λ. In our model, the distribution of employment
across ﬁrms in a symmetric steady-state depends on the elasticity parameter ρ only through
the trade intensity for ﬁrms that do export given by D1−ρ/(1+D1−ρ). Since our calibration
procedure is based on employment data, we choose the trade intensity D1−ρ/(1+D1−ρ) as a
parameter, and hence our steady-state calibration is invariant to the choice of ρ. For similar
reasons, our steady-state calibration is also invariant to the choice of λ.
We now describe how all parameters are chosen. We set β so that the steady-state interest
rate (annualized) is 5%. We normalize L =1 . Now consider the parameters shaping the law
of motion of ﬁrm productivity z (s, δ, ne, nf, σe, ¯ nx,σnx,D 1−ρ, h and b). We choose s so
that the standard deviation of the growth rate of employment of large ﬁrms in the model
is 25% on an annualized basis. This ﬁgure is in the range of those for US publicly-traded
ﬁrms reported in Davis et. al. (2006).9 We choose the exogenous death rate δ so that the
model’s annual employment-weighted death rate of large ﬁrms is 0.55%, consistent with the
corresponding one for large ﬁrms in the US data.10 Note that in our model, over the course
of one year, large ﬁrms do not choose to exit endogenously because they have productivity
far away from the threshold productivity for exit. Hence δ determines the annual exit rate
of these ﬁrms directly. We normalize ne =1 , and set nf =0 .1.11
Corresponding to each value of b (3000, 30 and 10),w ec h o o s et h ep a r a m e t e r sσe, ¯ nx,σnx,
D1−ρ,a n dh to match the following ﬁve observations. First, the fraction of employment by
entering ﬁrms of size under 500 is 90% of all employment in entering ﬁrms.12 Note that ﬁrm
sizes in terms of number of employees in the model are simply a normalization. We choose
this normalization so that the median ﬁrm in the employment-based size distribution is of
size 500.I n o t h e r w o r d s ,50% of total employment in the model is accounted for by ﬁrms
9We abstract from the trend in employment growth rate volatility discussed in Davis et. al. (2006) and
pick a number that roughly matches the average for the period 1980-2001.
10This is the 1997-2002 average employment-based failure rate of US ﬁrms larger than 500 employees,
computed using data reported by the Statistics of U.S. Businesses and Nonemployer Statistics.
11The statistics that we report are invariant to proportional changes in all three ﬁxed costs and h.
12This fraction is the 1999-2003 average calculated using US ﬁrms birth data, computed using data reported
by the Statistics of U.S. Businesses and Nonemployer Statistics.
24of size under 500.13 Second, the fraction of total employment accounted for by exporting
ﬁrms is 40%, and third, the fraction of exports in gross output is 7.5%.14 We abstract from
variation in trade costs across sectors. Fourth, we match patterns of ﬁrms switching from
exporters to non-exporters, and vice-versa, over time. We simulate the steady state of the
model for seven years to compare the model’s predictions with those in the US between
1993 and 2000 reported in Bernard et. al. (2005). The employment-based switching rate is
deﬁned as the average of the year seven employment of non-exporters that become exporters,
and the year-one employment of exporters that become non-exporters, as a fraction of total
exporter’s employment. Using the data in Bernard et. al. (2005) we compute this seven
year switching rate in US data to be 12%.
For the ﬁf t ho b s e r v a t i o n ,w em a t c ht h es h a p eo ft h er i g h tt a i lo ft h eﬁrm size distribution
in the U.S. Speciﬁcally, consider representing the right tail of the distribution of employment
across ﬁrms in the U.S. data with a function that maps the logarithm of the number of
employees log(l) into the logarithm of the fraction of total employment employed in ﬁrms
with this employment or larger. We plot this function in Panel B, Figure 1, for ﬁrms of size 5
to 10000. If the distribution of employment across ﬁrms actually was Pareto, this functions
would be a straight line. As is evident in this ﬁgure, this function is close to linear, with
the slope becoming steeper for larger ﬁrms. In calibrating the model with inelastic process
innovation (ﬁxed p for all ﬁrms) we set the model parameters so that the model matches the
slope coeﬃcient for ﬁrms within a certain size range. This calibration procedure is similar
to that used by Luttmer (2006). Concretely, we target a slope coeﬃcient of −0.2 for ﬁrms
ranging between 1000 and 5000 employees, as in Panel B, Figure 1. The calibrated model
then implies a value of ¯ px for large ﬁrms from (5.2) and (5.3). As we lower b, we adjust the
model parameters to keep ¯ px c o n s t a n ta n dt h u sk e e pt h ed y n a m i c so fl a r g eﬁrms unchanged.
Table 1 summarizes the observations used in the calibration, as well as the resulting
parameter values, for each level of b. Recall that by calibrating the model to data on ﬁrm
size, we did not need to take a stand on the values of ρ and λ. The aggregate implications
of changes in trade costs are, however, aﬀected by the values of ρ and λ. In our benchmark
13This is the size of the median ﬁrm in the US ﬁrm employment-based size distribution on average in the
period 1999-2003, as reported by the Statistics of U.S. Businesses and Nonemployer Statistics.
14Bernard et. al. (2005) report that the fraction of total US empoyment (excluding a few sectors such as
agriculture, education, and public services) accounted for by exporters is 36.3% in 1993 and 39.4% in 2000.
The average of exports and imports to gross output for the comparable set of sectors is roughly 7.5% in the
U.S. in 2000. The steady state of our model abstracts from trends in trade costs that would lead to changes
in trade volumes over time.
25parameterization we set ρ =5 ,a n dλ =0 .5.15
We now discuss some steady state implications of our calibrated model. We start with
the parametrization that assumes inelastic process innovation. We then discuss how some of
these additional implications of the model change as we decrease the curvature parameter b
on the innovation cost function, and hence increase the elasticity of process innovation.
Steady state implications: Inelastic process innovation
The benchmark calibration with high b (b = 3000) gives p(z)=¯ p constant for all z (see
Panel A in Figure 1). Panel C of Figures 1 displays the one-year growth rate of continuing
ﬁr m sa saf u n c t i o no ft h el o go fﬁrm size. In it, we observe that for small ﬁrms, the model
generates growth rates for continuing ﬁrms that are decreasing in size. This is consistent
with Gibrat’s law: small surviving ﬁrms grow faster than large ﬁrms due to selection, and
among larger ﬁrms growth is unrelated to size.16
Panel B of Figure 1 shows that the employment-based size distribution implied by the
model resembles that in the U.S. for ﬁrms ranging between 5 and 10000 employees (recall
that our calibration procedure targets the slope in the data for ﬁrms between 1000 and 5000
employees).17
We also assess the benchmark model’s implications for the size distribution and growth
dynamics of exporters, in relation to the data reported in Bernard et. al. (2005). Panel D in
Figure 1 displays the exporters’ employment size distribution of the model and the US data
in 2000. The size distribution generated by the model is only slightly more concentrated
than that in the data. This suggests that the concentration of exporters is not that striking
in light of the concentration of ﬁrms in the overall economy.18
15Our choice of ρ =5roughly coincides with the average elasticity of substitution for US imports of
diﬀerentiated 4-digit goods estimated in Broda and Weinstein (2006) for the period 1990-2001. Due to the
scarcity of information on the value of λ, we perform sensitivity analysis for a wide range of λ between 0.25
and 0.95.
16Note that selection only operates for very small ﬁrms. Extending the model to allow for cross-ﬁrm
variation in ﬁxed costs would generate a smoothly decreasing conditional growth schedule.
17Note that if the size distribution were Pareto, then the slope of the right tail distribution based on
the number of ﬁrms (this function maps ﬁrm employment into the logarithm of the fraction of ﬁrms with
this or higher employment) would be equal to the slope of the employment-based right tail coeﬃcient plus
o n e .B o t ht h ed a t aa n dt h em o d e ls h o was i z ed i s t r i b u t ion that departs from a Pareto distribution in the
sense that the slope of the employment-based size distribution is steeper than that of the ﬁrm-based size
distribution. The distribution of entrants G plays the key role in the model in shaping this departure from
a Pareto distribution.
18Bernard et. al. (2005) report that the exporters’ concentration of export values is signiﬁcantly more
concentrated than that of employment. This suggest that large exporters also have a higher trade intensity.
Our model abstracts from these considerations.
26Steady state implications: Elastic process innovation
We now re-calibrate our model using lower values for the innovation cost curvature, b.
Speciﬁcally, we consider b =3 0 ,a n db =1 0 . The resulting parameter values are presented
in columns 2 and 3 of Table 1.
In Panel A of Figures 2 and 3 we plot the innovation intensity p(z) and the fraction
of exporting ﬁrms x(z) for operating ﬁrms z. A sw el o w e rb, ﬁrms that export (those
with x(z) > 0) choose a higher investment in innovation than non-exporters (those with
x(z)=0 ).
Panel C of Figures 2 and 3 again displays the one-year growth rate of continuing ﬁrms as a
function of the log of ﬁrm size. Recall that in the model with inelastic process innovation (b =
3000) ,c o n s i s t e n tw i t hG i b r a t ’ sl a w ,t h eg r o w t hr a t ei spo s i t i v ef o rs m a l lﬁrms due to selection,
and is roughly zero for larger ﬁrms. As we lower b, the slope of the conditional growth rate
schedule is the result of a tension between selection (negative slope) and increasing innovation
intensity (positive slope). Panel C in Figures 2 and 3 shows that the second force strengthens
as we lower b. Under b =3 0 , conditional growth rates become increasing in size, but these
diﬀerences in growth rates across sizes are still quite small. Under b =1 0 , the second force is
very strong, leading to growth rates of large ﬁrms that are over 10 percentage points higher
than the growth rates of small ﬁrms. Very low levels of b thus deliver a clear violation of
Gibrat’s law.
Panel B in Figures 2 and 3 compares the employment-based size distribution produced
by the model with US data. As we lower b, our calibration procedure of ﬁxing ¯ px implies
that the slope of the ﬁrm size distribution for large ﬁrms remains in line with the data. But
the model generates a divergence from the data for smaller ﬁrms. In particular, a lower
innovation intensity for small ﬁrms and non-exporters shows up as a ﬂatter slope of the
distribution for these ﬁrms relative to large ﬁrms. We quantify this change in the slope of
the ﬁrm size distribution as the ratio of the employment-based slope coeﬃcient for ﬁrms of
size 100 − 1000 to that of ﬁrms of size 5000 − 10,000. This ratio is equal to 0.74 under
b =3 0 0 0 , 0.86 under b =3 0 ,a n d1.38 under b =1 0 . This ﬂattening of the slope of the
distribution under b =1 0is counterfactual relative to US data (see Panel B).
As a further check on our model, we also consider our model’s implications for variation
in process innovation intensity with ﬁrm size for diﬀerent values of the parameter b. We ﬁnd
that our model implies that there is at most a very small systematic relationship between
27research intensity and ﬁrm size for large ﬁrms even when b =1 0 . Speciﬁcally, consider the
slope coeﬃcient of a regression of the logarithm of each ﬁrms’ innovative investment (as
measured by H(z,p)) o ni t ss i z ea sm e a s u r e db ys a l e s . When we run this regression in
our model using only ﬁrms of size larger than 500 (these ﬁrms account for 50% of total
employment), this coeﬃcient ranges from 1.004 when b =3 0to 1.06 when b =1 0 . These
results are roughly consistent with the data surveyed in Cohen (1995) and Cohen and Klepper
(1996). Thus it does not appear that direct data on research intensity across ﬁrms of diﬀerent
sizes is that useful for disciplining the choice of the parameter b in our model. Diﬀerences
in research intensity across ﬁrms do appear if smaller ﬁrms are included in this regression.
In particular, if all ﬁrms of size larger than 5 are included, the regression coeﬃcient ranges
from 1.03 when b =3 0to 1.54 when b =1 0 . However, it is diﬃcult to compare our model
to the data in this case because data on the research intensity of smaller ﬁrms are typically
not available.
Overall, we see that our model, in steady state, reproduces quantitatively many salient
features of the US data on ﬁrm dynamics and export behavior if the curvature parameter b
is suﬃciently high so that process innovation decisions are not too elastic.
8. Aggregate implications of a decline in marginal trade costs
We now study the aggregate implications of a trade liberalization, deﬁn e da sar e d u c t i o ni n
marginal trade costs D leading to an increase in the trade intensity of ﬁrms that export. We
choose to lower D so that the export intensity of exporters, D1−ρ/(1 + D1−ρ),i n c r e a s e sb y
af a c t o ro f1.15. Using this procedure, the resulting change in steady state exports/GDP is
invariant to the elasticity parameter ρ.19 Results are reported in Tables 2, 3 and in Figure
4.
To understand the aggregate implications of a change in trade costs, we can express
aggregate output in a symmetric equilibrium as the product of an average productivity index
˜ zt, the measure of operating ﬁrms Nt, and production employment L − Lmt (see Appendix)
Yt =( ˜ zt)
1/(ρ−1) (Nt)
1/(ρ−1) (L − Lmt). (8.1)
Here ˜ zt is the average productivity index exp(z)(1+x(z)D1−ρ) across operating ﬁrms,
evaluated using the distribution Mt (z)/Nt.
19In our benchmark calibration, the initial export intensity of exporters is 18.75%.W i t h ρ =5 ,o u r
experiment amounts to reducing D from 1.44 to 1.38.
28A reduction in marginal trade costs D has two static eﬀects on output both of which
aﬀect average productivity ˜ zt : o n eb yi m p r o v i n gt h et e c h n o l ogy of shipping goods abroad,
and the other by changing ﬁrms’ exit and export decisions xt (z).I ta l s oh a st w od y n a m i c
eﬀects on output: one by changing ﬁrms’ process innovation decisions pt (z) –w h i c hs h a p e
the distribution Mt (z)/Nt over which the average productivity index ˜ zt is calculated – and
the other by changing the level of product innovation – which changes Nt.
Steady State
Consider the model with inelastic process innovation (b =3 0 0 0 ). In Row 1, Column 1
of Table 2, we see that steady state exports/GDP increases by a factor of 1.22 (from 7.5%
to 9.1%). This is larger than the change in export intensity of ﬁrms, for two reasons. First,
exporters are larger than non-exporters, so a change in their export intensity has a more
than proportional impact on exports/GDP. Second, the reduction in trade costs induces
more ﬁrms to pay the ﬁxed cost of exporting.
Now consider the model with elastic process innovation (b =3 0and b = 10). The results
are reported in Row 1, Columns 2 and 3 of Table 2. Now exports/GDP increases by a factor
of 1.4 when b =3 0(from 7.5% to 10.5%), and 2.71 when b =1 0(from 7.5% to 20.1%). The
model with elastic process innovation ampliﬁes the impact of the reduction in the trade costs
on trade volumes because those ﬁrms that export increase their investments in process inno-
vation and those that do not export decrease their investments in process innovation. These
shifts in process innovation, by shifting the distribution of ﬁrm productivities Mt (z)/Nt,
imply that the average productivity index across ﬁrms ˜ z increases by a factor of 1.02 when
b =3 0 0 0 , 1.14 when b =3 0 ,a n d9.1 when b =1 0 .
Consider now the implications of this reallocation of process innovative activity on the
steady state distribution of ﬁrm size. When process innovation is inelastic, the distribution
of ﬁrm sizes changes very little. For example, if we consider the concentration of production
as measured by the fraction of employment in ﬁrms with greater than 5000 employees, this
rises from 32.4% to 33.1% when process innovation is inelastic. In contrast, this measure
of concentration rises from 32% to 39% when b =3 0 ,a n df r o m27% to 91% when b =1 0 .
Hence, our model predicts that there are substantial changes in the size distribution of ﬁrms
in those cases in which there are also substantial long-run changes in the response of trade
to a reduction in marginal trade costs. These changes in the ﬁrm size distribution might
be used to discipline the choice of b. In particular, very low values of b lead to implausibly
29large shifts in the ﬁrm size distribution in response to a relatively small increase in export
intensity.
The impact of a decline in marginal trade costs on product innovation are very diﬀerent
from those discussed in Section 4 when all ﬁrms export. Recall from Proposition 2 that if
ρ + λ>2, then the measure of ﬁrms increases when all ﬁrms export. In contrast, when
not all ﬁrms export, the measure of ﬁrms falls. Row 5 of Table 2 reports that the measure
of ﬁrms falls by a factor 0.99 when b =3 0 0 0 , 0.88 when b =3 0 ,a n d0.11 when b =1 0 .
To understand this change in the measure of ﬁrms, we can write an expression for variable
proﬁts from the ﬁrm’s domestic operations Πd/Wm (see Appendix) as:
Πd/Wm =¯ κ(˜ zN)
(2−ρ−λ)/(ρ−1) (L − Lm) , (8.2)
where ¯ κ is a constant determined by ρ and λ. A decline in marginal trade costs leads to a
small decrease in Πd/Wm to satisfy the free-entry condition, and also leads to a large increase
in average productivity ˜ z (as discussed in Section 5). This small decline in Πd/Wm and large
increase in ˜ z are determined from the Bellman equation (5.1) and the free entry condition
(4.2). Production employment L−Lm increases only slightly, so (8.2) requires that N must
fall substantially to oﬀset the large increase in ˜ z when process innovation is elastic. Hence, a
reduction in the marginal costs of trade results, in equilibrium, in a reallocation of innovative
activity into innovation within ongoing ﬁrms and away from the creation of new ﬁrms.
Row 2 of Table 2 reports the steady state increase in ﬁnal output Y resulting from the
decline in trade costs. The increase in output is 0.09% when b = 3000, 0.32% when b =3 0 ,
and 1.94% when b =1 0 . Hence, elastic process innovation also magniﬁes the output increase
from a decline in variable trade costs. Using (8.1), we can break this change in ﬁnal output
into an increase in average productivity ˜ z that is partly oﬀs e tb yad e c l i n ei nt h em e a s u r eo f
operating ﬁrms N (both of which get larger as we lower b), and a small change in production
employment (L − Lm falls slightly when b =3 0 0 0and increases slightly when b =1 0 ).
Finally, Row 3 of Table 2 displays the increase in ﬁnal consumption in response to a
decline in trade costs. Consumption increases by a factor of 1.001 when b =3 0 0 0 , 1.005
when b =3 0 ,a n d1.033 when b =1 0 . The change in consumption diﬀers from the change
in output due to the reallocation of resources between production of research and ﬁnal
consumption.
30Transition dynamics
Figure 4 displays the path of exports/GDP (Panel A) and consumption (Panel B) in
the transition to the new steady state, for each value of b. While the transition is almost
immediate in the economy with inelastic process innovation, it takes many years when process
innovation is elastic. The change in the innovation intensity of exporters increases their
expected growth, but this higher growth takes time to materialize as higher levels of exports.
In the transition, the distribution of ﬁrm level productivities Mt (z)/Nt slowly shifts, leading
to a gradual increase in the export share and consumption.
The model with elastic process innovation is capable of producing substantial diﬀerences
in the short- and long-run response of trade volumes to a trade liberalization. The contem-
poraneous increase in exports/GDP as a fraction of the overall increase across steady states,
reported in Row 7, Columns 1-3 of Table 2, is 99% under b = 3000, 54% under b =3 0 ,a n d
14% under b =1 0 .
Welfare
We compute welfare as the equivalent variation in consumption that keeps the represen-
tative household indiﬀerent between the economy with high and low trade costs, taking into
account the transition dynamics. Row 8 of Table 2 reports the welfare gains from a reduction
in the marginal cost of trade. In our benchmark model with b =3 0 0 0 , the welfare gains are
0.36%. These welfare gains correspond to the welfare gains one would ﬁnd in a calibrated
version of Melitz’ (2003) model.
We do not take a stand on whether these welfare gains are large or small. Instead, we
focus on the question of how consideration of elastic process innovation aﬀects these welfare
gains. We have seen that elastic process innovation has a large impact on our model’s
implications for trade costs on trade volumes, output, and consumption. In contrast, we see
in Row 8 of Table 2 that the welfare gains are only slightly higher when we consider elastic
process innovation.
Consideration of elastic process innovation does not substantially alter the welfare impli-
cations of a reduction in international marginal trade costs, for two reasons. First, investing
in process innovation is costly in that resources are drawn out of alternative activities. Sec-
ond, the productivity gains from this investment come only slowly.
Sensitivity Analysis
Table 3 reports some sensitivity analysis with respect to key parameters of the model.
31For comparison, Columns 1-3 reports the results for our benchmark model (also reported in
Table 2).
We ﬁrst consider a calibration of the model with a higher initial share of exports in GDP
(15% instead of 7.5%) to see if greater exposure to trade aﬀects our results. These results
are presented in columns 4-6 of Table 3. As in our benchmark experiments, we reduce D so
that the export intensity of exporters rises by a factor of 1.15. The welfare gains are roughly
double than those under our benchmark calibration, but as in our benchmark model, the
v a r i a t i o ni nw e l f a r eg a i n sa c r o s sl e v e l so fbis still small in comparison to the change in trade
volumes, output, and consumption.
Next, we report results for a lower elasticity of substitution (ρ =2instead of ρ =5 )–
columns 7-9 of Table 3. Recall that the elasticity parameter ρ does not aﬀect our model’s
implications for the change steady-state process innovation in response to a given change in
ﬁrms’ steady-state export intensity D1−ρ/(1 + D1−ρ). Output gains are larger the lower is
ρ (i.e.: from (8.1), a given change in aggregate productivity index ˜ z translates into a larger
change in ﬁnal output), and these translate into welfare gains that are 4 to 5 times larger.
Even though the diﬀerences in welfare gains across values of b are higher (1.6% for b =3 0 0 0
and 2.2% for b =1 0 ), these diﬀerences across values of b are small relative to the diﬀerences
in the change in steady state consumption across values of b.
We now report results when new ﬁrms are larger, and hence more likely to be exporters –
columns 10-12 of Table 3. As we discussed in Section 5, the size distribution of newly entering
ﬁrms aﬀects our model’s implications for the impact of a reduction in marginal trade costs on
the absolute levels of process innovation in small and large ﬁrms. We change the parameters
of our benchmark model so that the fraction of employment by entering ﬁrms of size under
500 is 72% of employment in entering ﬁrms instead of 90% in our benchmark calibration –
this requires increasing the variance σe of productivities of entering ﬁrms. In rows 4 and
5 of Table 3, we see that there is a smaller reallocation of process innovation as measured
b yt h ei n c r e a s ei na v e r a g ep r o d u c t i v i t y˜ z, and a smaller reduction in product innovation
as measured by the number of ﬁrms. To understand the smaller response of process and
product innovation recall that, as discussed above, free entry requires that Πd/Wm must fall
by more when entering ﬁrms are more likely to export. As a result, proﬁts of exporters rise
by less and hence so does their process innovation. This eﬀect is what generates a smaller
increase in average productivity. From (8.2), we then get the smaller decline in the number
32of ﬁrms. Note that the results for welfare are largely unchanged relative to those in our
benchmark parameterization.
We then consider the role of the share of labor in the production of research goods
(λ =0 .25 and λ =0 .95) – columns 13-18 of Table 3. This parameter is known to aﬀect
the change in product innovation in response to a given change in ﬁrm proﬁts. Note that,
for low levels of b, the decline in the measure of ﬁrms is slightly larger under λ =0 .25.
This is because the value of entering ﬁrms (which tend to be small non-exporters) falls
substantially for low b, so labor is reallocated from research to production and ﬁnal goods
are reallocated from research to consumption. This results stands in contrast to the model
with full export participation, in which the increase in the measure of ﬁrms is decreasing in λ
(e.g.: the number of ﬁr m si sc o n s t a n tu n d e rλ =1 ). Note, however, that quantitatively these
diﬀerences are small. In particular, the steady state changes in consumption and welfare do
not vary substantially with λ.
We then consider a version of our model in which process innovation costs H(z,p) scale
up with export intensity – columns 19-21 of Table 3. That is, H(z,p)=hexp(z)exp(bp)
for non-exporters and H(z,p)=hexp(z)exp(bp)(1+D1−ρ) for exporters. As we discussed
in Section 6, under this speciﬁcation, the growth rate diﬀerences between exporters and large
non-exporters in a steady state are small even for a low value of b. T h ea g g r e g a t er e s u l t si n
columns 19-21 of Table 3 reveal that this alternative speciﬁcation generates a reduction in
the impact of the decline in trade costs on trade volumes and consumption relative to our
benchmark model in which process innovation costs scale with exp(z). This is because, for
exporters, the scaled-incentives to innovate fall relative to the cost of innovation, so they cut
their level of process innovation.
Finally, we consider a version of the model in which exporters grow faster than non-
exporters due to the presence of externalities and spillovers from export activities – columns
22-24 of Table 3. We refer to this model as ‘learning-by-exporting’. In this model, diﬀer-
ences in growth across ﬁrms are assumed rather than being the outcome of ﬁrms’ optimal
choice of innovation investment. Moreover, process innovation costs do not appear in the
resource constraint (2.13). We use this case to demonstrate that our assumption that ﬁrms’
investments in process innovation are costly are critical in generating our results for welfare.
We set the growth rate of exporters and non-exporters at the steady state levels ¯ pd and ¯ px
that we solved for in the Lemma of Section 5 (both before and after the reduction in trade
33costs). We consider the same experiment of increasing the trade intensity of exporters by a
factor of 1.15. The increase in steady state consumption and welfare is signiﬁcantly larger
in the model with ‘learning-by-exporting’. For example, if we assume that exporters and
non-exporters grow at the rates of the benchmark model under b =1 0 , consumption and
welfare increase by 12% and 2.2%, respectively (they increase by 3.2% and 0.4% , respec-
tively, in the model with process innovation). When ﬁrms ‘learn-by-exporting’, increases
in their growth rates do not take up research goods, so employment and ﬁnal good can be
reallocated towards production and ﬁnal consumption, respectively. It is only in this case
that the welfare gains from a reduction in marginal trade costs vary substantially depending
on the assumptions regarding the impact of exporting on ﬁrm growth.
We conclude from this sensitivity analysis that, even when reallocation in process inno-
vation leads to very large steady state changes in export volumes, output, consumption, and
substantial changes in the ﬁrm size distribution, the dynamic gains of trade are not much
larger than those in a model with inelastic process innovation. The dynamic gains can be
substantial when ﬁrms ‘learn-by-exporting’ without requiring research resources, particularly
when this learning eﬀect is large.
Other experiments
We now examine the response of our model economy to three additional aggregate ex-
periments. First, we re-examine the response to a decline in marginal trade costs under the
optimal allocations of our model. Second, we consider a reduction in marginal trade costs in
an asymmetric two country world economy (i.e.: small open economy). Third, we consider
ar e d u c t i o ni nt h eﬁxed costs of exporting.
Optimal allocations
We examine process an product innovation in the planning problem that maximizes
welfare in the two countries. The equilibrium allocations are potentially suboptimal due to
the presence of markups in the prices set by the intermediate good producing ﬁrms, which
can distort product innovation. It is straightforward to show that, if λ =1 , the allocations
of the planning problem coincide with the equilibrium allocations both in and out of steady
state. If λ<1, then the measure of ﬁrms and the level of consumption are higher in the
planning problem because the monopoly distortion alters the value of entry relative to the
cost of entry.
In our benchmark parameterization with λ =0 .5, changes in the allocations and welfare
34gains from reducing the level of marginal trade costs as discussed above are very similar in
the planning problem and equilibrium allocations. The welfare gains in the planning problem
are 0.37% with b =3 0 0 0 , 0.4% with b =3 0 ,a n d0.44% with b =1 0 .
Small open economy
We now consider a version of our model with asymmetric countries. In particular we
assume that the home country is very small relative to the foreign country, and aggregate
variables in the foreign country are held constant. In particular, we assume that home ﬁrms
face a foreign demand a∗
t(z)=p∗
at(z)−ρ, where we normalize Y ∗
t = P∗
t =1 .W ea b s t r a c tf r o m
considerations of product variety for imported goods by assuming the presence of a single
imported intermediate good that is available to the home country at a price equal to D∗,
where D can diﬀer from D∗. We also abstract from dynamic considerations in the current
account by assuming trade balance every period.
We consider a reduction in marginal trade costs such that, when b = 3000, exports/GDP
in the home country increases by the same factor of 1.22 as in the symmetric two-country
model (implying also very similar output and welfare gains). For lower levels of b,f o rt h e
same change in D, GDP rises in the home country relative to the rest of the world, and the
exporter’s export intensity increases by less than in the symmetric model. This implies that
the reallocation of proﬁts and process innovation from non-exporters to exporters is smaller
compared to the symmetric two-country world. Across steady states, exports/GDP rises by
af a c t o ro f0.27 if b =3 0and by a factor of 1.34 if b =1 0(it increases by a factor of 1.4 and
2.71, respectively, in the symmetric economy). Taking into account the transition dynamics,
the welfare gains are still very similar for values of b ranging between 3000 and 10.
Reduction in ﬁxed costs of exporting
We also consider the aggregate implications of a reduction in the average ﬁxed cost of
exporting, ¯ nx.W ec h o o s et h ed e c l i n ei n¯ nx so that the increase in exports/GDP on impact
roughly matches the one from reducing D in the benchmark experiments discussed above
(i.e. a factor of 1.22) This requires lowering nx by roughly 60%.
T h ed e c l i n ei n¯ nx leads to an increase in export participation, and new exporters increase
their level of process innovation investment. This increase in innovation activities by new
e x p o r t e r si sp a r t l yo ﬀset by a decline in process innovation by continuing exporters and
non-exporters as discussed in Section 5.
Overall, this reallocation of process innovation activities leads to an increase in the frac-
35tion of research goods used in process innovation. Thus, the model with elastic process
innovation ampliﬁes the impact of the reduction in the ﬁxed trade costs on trade volumes.
Comparing across steady states, exports/GDP increases by a factor of 1.22 under b =3 0 0 0 ,
1.28 under b =3 0 ,a n d1.37 under b =1 0 . However, taking into account transition dynam-
ics, the equivalent variation in consumption is very similar in the model with inelastic and
elastic process innovation. These welfare gains are also very close to those obtained from a
reduction in marginal trade costs.
9. Concluding remarks
In this paper we build a model of the impact of international trade on ﬁrms’ process and
product innovation decisions. We show that the extent of ﬁrm’s export participation has
an important inﬂuence on the impact of changes in trade costs on process and product
innovation. We show in a quantitative version of our model that, in response to a decline
in international trade costs, changes in process and product innovation largely oﬀset. We
also ﬁnd that the dynamic welfare gains from trade when process innovation is elastic are
not substantially larger than those gains when it is not. This is true despite the fact that
elastic process innovation leads to very large dynamic responses of exports and the ﬁrm size
distribution.
Our model has abstracted from three important considerations. First, we have assumed
constant elasticity of demand. This assumption implies that changes in trade cost have no
impact on ﬁrms’ markups and that there is no strategic interaction in ﬁrms’ aﬀecting process
innovation decisions. Ericson and Pakes (1995), and Aghion et. al. (2003) consider models
of process innovation with strategic interactions.
Second, in making our model quantitative, we have assumed that all ﬁrms are single-
product ﬁrms. In doing so, we have abstracted from the eﬀects that a reduction in trade
costs might have on product innovation by incumbent ﬁrms. Consideration of process and
product innovation in models with multi-product ﬁrms would be an important extension of
this paper (see Klette and Kortum 2004, Luttmer 2007, and Bernard, Redding and Schott
2007 for models of multi-product ﬁrms).
Finally, we have also abstracted from spillover eﬀects that might lead to endogenous
growth. Since we have found that a decline in trade costs can lead to a substantial reallocation
of process and product innovation, a model with spillovers favoring one type of innovation
36over the other might predict larger welfare gains when process innovation is elastic.
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3910. Appendices
10.1. Appendix 1: Equilibrium Characterization
We ﬁr s td e s c r i b et h em o d i ﬁc a t i o n st ot h em o d e li nS e c t i o n2w i t ht h et w oe x t e n s i o n si n t r o -
duced in Section 6. Next, we state the aggregate equilibrium conditions of the model. Then,
we specialize the equilibrium conditions to the symmetric case. Finally, we specialize these
conditions to a steady state, and sketch an algorithm to solve for allocations and prices.
Extending the basic model of Section 2
We ﬁrst introduce random exporting costs and ﬁxed operating costs into the basic model
of Section 2.
Let ξt(z,nx) ∈ {0,1} be an indicator of the export decision of home ﬁrms with productiv-
ity z and ﬁxed cost nx (it is 1 if the ﬁrm exports and 0 otherwise). Let xt(z)=
R
ξt(z,nx)dGx
be the fraction of home ﬁrms with productivity index z that export any output at all. Deﬁne
ξ
∗
t, x∗
t in the same manner. Then feasibility in production for intermediate good z in the
home country requires that
at(z)+xt(z)Da
∗
t(z)=yt(z)
and that nf +
R
ξt(z,nx)nxdGx units of the research good be used to pay ﬁxed costs of
operation and exporting.
Static proﬁts, exclusive of ﬁxed costs of production, are given by
Πt(z)= m a x
l(nx),pa,p∗
a,a,a∗,ξ(nx)∈[0,1]
paa +
Z
ξ(nx)dGxp
∗
aa
∗ − Wt
Z
l(nx)dGx − Wmt
Z
ξ(nx)nxdGx
(10.1)
subject to
a + ξ(nx)Da
∗ =e x p ( z)
1
ρ−1l(nx)
a n dd e m a n df u n c t i o n s
a =
µ
pa
Pt
¶−ρ
Yt and a
∗ =
µ
p∗
a
P∗
t
¶−ρ
Y
∗
t .
Note that it is not necessary to index prices pa, p∗
a or quantities a and a∗ by nx. Clearly the
optimal choices of these variables does not depend of the level of the ﬁxed cost of exports.
The expected discounted present value of proﬁts satisﬁes the Bellman equation
Vt(z)=m a x[ 0 ,V
o
t (z)] (10.2)
40where
V
o
t (z)=m a x
p∈[0,1]
Πt(z) − Wmtnf − Wmthexp(z)c(p)+ (10.3)
(1 − δ)
Qt+1
Qt
[pVt+1(z + s)+( 1− p)Vt+1(z − s)].
Note here that V 0
t (z) is the value of choosing to operate the ﬁrm in period t. The ﬁrm exits if
this value falls below zero. Since V 0
t (z) is strictly increasing in z, it is clear that at each date
t, the decision of ﬁrms to operate (10.2) follows a cutoﬀ rule with ﬁrms with productivity
above a cutoﬀ ¯ zt choosing to operate and ﬁrms with productivity below that cutoﬀ exiting.
Note that if nf =0 ,t h e nV o
t (z)=Vt(z) and ¯ zt = −∞.
The feasibility constraint on labor in the home country is given by
ZZ
lt(z,nx)dGxdMt(z)+Lmt = L (10.4)
a n dl i k e w i s ei nt h ef o r e i g nc o u n t r y .
The feasibility constraint on the research good in the home country is
Metne +
Z µ
nf +
Z
ξt(z,nx)nxdGx + hexp(z)c(pt(z))
¶
dMt(z)=F(Xt,L mt), (10.5)
a n dl i k e w i s ei nt h ef o r e i g nc o u n t r y .
The evolution of the measure of operating ﬁrms Mt(z) over time, taking into account
endogenous exit, is given by
Mt+1(z
0)=( G(z
0) − G(¯ zt+1))Met + (10.6)
(1 − δ)
Z z0−s
¯ zt+1−s
pt(z)dMt(z)+
(1 − δ)
Z z0+s
¯ zt+1+s
(1 − pt(z))dMt(z)
for z0 ≥ ¯ zt+1, and Mt+1(z0)=0for z0 < ¯ zt+1. The evolution of M∗
t (z) for foreign ﬁrms is
deﬁned analogously.
Aggregate equilibrium conditions
It is convenient to deﬁne four indices of aggregate productivity across ﬁrms. For home
ﬁrms these are
Zat =
Z
exp(z)dMt(z) and Za∗t =
Z
exp(z)xt(z)dMt(z) (10.7)
41where the ﬁrst of these is an index of productivity aggregated across all operating ﬁrms (recall
that Mt takes into account endogenous exit), and the second is an index of productivity across
all ﬁrms that export. Likewise, for the foreign ﬁrms we have
Z
∗
b∗t =
Z
exp(z)dM
∗
t (z) and Z
∗
bt =
Z
exp(z)x
∗
t(z)dM
∗
t (z). (10.8)
The deﬁnition of the price index in the home country (2.5) and the analogous for the
foreign country imply
1=
ρ
ρ − 1
"µ
Wt
Pt
¶1−ρ
Zat +
µ
D
P∗
t
Pt
W∗
t
P∗
t
¶1−ρ
Z
∗
bt
#1/(1−ρ)
, (10.9)
1=
ρ
ρ − 1
"µ
W∗
t
P∗
t
¶1−ρ
Z
∗
b∗t +
µ
D
Pt
P∗
t
Wt
Pt
¶1−ρ
Za∗t
#1/(1−ρ)
. (10.10)
Labor market clearing requires that
µ
ρ − 1
ρ
¶ρ µ
Wt
Pt
¶−ρ
Yt
"
Zat +
µ
Pt
P∗
t
¶−ρ
D
1−ρZa∗t
Y ∗
t
Yt
#
+ Lmt = L (10.11)
µ
ρ − 1
ρ
¶ρ µ
W∗
t
P∗
t
¶−ρ
Y
∗
t
"
D
1−ρ
µ
P∗
t
Pt
¶−ρ
Z
∗
bt
Yt
Y ∗
t
+ Z
∗
b∗t
#
+ L
∗
mt = L
∗. (10.12)
The ﬁrst order conditions for the production of the research good implies
F2(Xt,L mt)
F1(Xt,L mt)
=
Wt
Pt
(10.13)
in the home country, and the analogous expression in the foreign country.
Note that with our assumption of log-utility and common intertemporal prices Qt across
countries, the ratio of expenditure across countries P∗
t C∗
t /PtCt is constant over time with
that constant determined by the initial distribution of assets ¯ W and ¯ W∗. More precisely, we
have
PtCt = β
tQ0
Qt
P0C0 and P
∗
t C
∗
t = β
tQ0
Qt
P
∗
0C
∗
0. (10.14)
Hence, given expenditure in period 0 and measures Mt−1 (z), M∗
t−1 (z), the aggregates
{Zat, Za∗t, Z∗
bt,Z ∗
b∗t, Lmt, L∗
mt,X t, X∗
t , Yt,Y ∗
t , Ct, C∗
t , Wt/Pt,W ∗
t /P ∗
t ,P t, and P∗
t } are
the solution to these eight equations (10.9)-(10.14), the feasibility constraints for the ﬁnal
good (2.11) in each country, and the free entry condition (2.10) in each country, with the
exit and export thresholds obtained from the solution of (10.2) and (10.3), the measures of
42ﬁrms Mt (z) and M∗
t (z) from (10.6), and the aggregate productivity indices from (10.7) and
(10.8). Firm entry Met in each country is solved for using the feasibility constraints for the
research good (10.5).
Symmetric equilibrium
From (3.3) and (3.4), home variable proﬁts are given by Πdt exp(z) for domestic sales
and ΠdtD1−ρ exp(z) for export sales, where
Πdt =
(Wt)
1−ρ (Pt)
ρ Yt
ρρ (ρ − 1)
1−ρ . (10.15)
Total static proﬁts (10.1) are given by
Πt(z)=Πdt exp(z)+
Z
max
©
ΠdtD
1−ρ exp(z) − Wmtnx,0
ª
dGx. (10.16)
Using conditions (10.9) and (10.11), aggregate output and the real wage are given by
Yt =
£
Zat + D
1−ρZa∗t
¤1/(ρ−1) (L − Lmt) , (10.17)
and
Wt
Pt
=
ρ − 1
ρ
Yt
L − Lmt
. (10.18)
Symmetric Steady State
We now describe how one can solve for the steady state allocations and prices in the
quantitative model. We normalize the aggregate price index P in each country to one.
1. Given
Πd
Wm, solve for the Bellman equations described by (10.2) and (10.3) rescaled by
the price of the research good Wm
w(z)=m a x[ 0 ,w
o (z)] (10.19)
w
o(z)= m a x
p∈[0,1],ξ (nx)
Πd
Wm
exp(z) − nf +
Z
max
½
Πd
Wm
D
1−ρ exp(z) − nx,0
¾
dGx
−hexp(z)c(p)+( 1− δ)β [pw(z + s)+( 1− p)w(z − s)] , (10.20)
and obtain the exit threshold ¯ z deﬁned by wo(¯ z)=0 ,a n dﬁrms’ export and process
innovations decisions. Note that in the absence of ﬁxed operating costs, wo(z)=w(z)
and ¯ z = −∞. Note also that in steady state, the discount factor is given by β.N o t e
also that, given our binomial process for z, we can solve the value functions in a discrete
grid given by {zlow,z low + s,zlow +2 s,...,z high − s,zhigh},w h e r ezlow and zhigh are the
low and high truncation of the grid, that are suﬃciently large so that we can impose
that z always belongs to the grid.
432. Solve for
Πd
Wm that satisﬁes the free entry condition
ne = β
Z
w(z)dG (10.21)
3. Compute the productivity measure normalized by the measure of entering ﬁrms, M (z)/Me,
using the steady state version of the law of motion for M, (10.6), and using ¯ z and p(z)
from 1.
4. Compute the aggregate productivity indices normalized by the number of entering
ﬁrms, ˜ za = Za/Me and ˜ za∗ = Za∗/Me:
˜ za =
Z
exp(z)
dM(z)
Me
and ˜ za∗ =
Z
exp(z)x(z)
dM(z)
Me
. (10.22)
Note that ˜ z,d e ﬁned in words in Section 8, is given by ˜ z =˜ za + D1−ρ˜ za∗.
5. Solve for the remaining 6 aggregate unknowns, (W, Y , C, X, Lm, Me)t h a ts a t i s f yt h e
following 6 equations:
Y =
£
Me
¡
˜ za +˜ za∗D
1−ρ¢¤1/(ρ−1) (L − Lm) (10.23)
W =
ρ − 1
ρ
Y
L − Lm
(10.24)
C + X = Y (10.25)
λ
1 − λ
X
Lm
= W (10.26)
Πd/Wm = κ(W)
1−ρ−λ Y (10.27)
ΥMe =( Lm)
λ (X)
1−λ , (10.28)
where 1/κ = ρρ (ρ − 1)
1−ρ (λ)
λ(1 − λ)
1−λ,a n dΥ is given by
Υ = ne +
Z
[nf + x(z)nx + hexp(z)c(p(z)]
dM(z)
Me
.
Expressions (10.23) and (10.24) are the steady state versions of the expressions for out-
put (10.17) and the real wage (10.18). Expression (10.25) is the resource constraint for
the ﬁnal good. Expression (10.26) combines the ﬁrst order condition for the production
of the research good (10.13) and the functional forms for F given by (4.3). Expression
(10.27) uses the deﬁnition of variable proﬁts (10.15) and Wm =
h
λ
λ (1 − λ)
1−λ
i−1
Wλ
(recall that we choose P as the numeraire). Finally, expression (10.28) is the steady
state version of the resource constraint for the research good, given by (2.13).
4410.2. Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 2
We use the steady state characterization of Appendix 1. When all ﬁrms export, ˜ za =˜ za∗.
We also have Π/Wm = Πd (1 + D1−ρ)/Wm.
First, given the result in Proposition 1 that process innovation decisions of ﬁrms (and
exit thresholds in the model with nf > 0) are unchanged with D in a steady state where all
ﬁrms export, ˜ za, Π/Wm,a n dΥ are also unchanged with D.
Second, Lm does not change with D. Starting from (10.27),
Π
Wm
=
κ(W)
1−ρ Y (1 + D1−ρ)
(W)
λ
=
κ
³
ρ
ρ−1
´ρ−1
Y
(W)
λMe˜ za
=
κ
³
ρ
ρ−1
´ρ−1 ¡
λ
1−λ
¢1−λ ΥY
WLm˜ za
= κ
µ
ρ
ρ − 1
¶ρ µ
λ
1 − λ
¶1−λ Υ
˜ za
(L − Lm)
Lm
,
where the ﬁrst step combines (10.23) and (10.24), the second step combines (10.26) and
(10.28), and the third step uses (10.24). Clearly, given that Π/Wm is unchanged with D, Lm
is unchanged too.
Third, we now have an expression for the number of entering ﬁrms Me.S t a r t i n ga g a i n
from (10.27),
Π
Wm
=
κ(W)
1−ρ Y (1 + D1−ρ)
(W)
λ
=
κ
³
ρ
ρ−1
´ρ−1
Y
(W)
λ Me˜ za
=
κ
³
ρ
ρ−1
´λ+ρ−1
Y 1−λ
Me˜ za
(L − Lm)
λ
= κ
µ
ρ
ρ − 1
¶λ+ρ−1
(Me˜ za)
(2−λ−ρ)/(ρ−1) ¡
1+D
1−ρ¢1−λ
ρ−1 (L − Lm)
where we used (10.23) and (10.24).
From this expression we can see that if λ =1 , Me does not change with D.I f λ<1,
45given that Π/Wm, ˜ za,a n dLm are independent of D, Me is decreasing in D if and only if
ρ + λ>2.
10.3. Appendix 3: Proof of Lemma
The ﬁrst part of the Lemma follows by construction. The term Ad exp(z) with Ad given as
above represents the expected discounted present value of variable proﬁts of a ﬁrm that sets
its process innovation decision p(z) to the constant ¯ pd and which never exports. Likewise,
the term Ax exp(z) with Ax given as above represents the expected discounted present value
of variable proﬁts of a ﬁrm that sets its process innovation decision p(z) to the constant ¯ px,
which always exports, and which is so large that the ﬁxed cost of exporting nx is a negligible
portion of its variable proﬁts.
For the second part of the Lemma, we show that Ad is increasing in Πd/Wm.D i ﬀerenti-
ating (5.2):
∂Ad
∂ (Πd/Wm)
=
1
1 − (1 − δ)β [¯ pd exp(s)+( 1− ¯ pd)exp(−s)]
+
∂Ad
∂¯ pd
∂¯ pd
∂Πd/Wm
> 0 ,
where we used the fact that process innovation choice is optimal, ∂Ad/∂¯ pd =0 ,a n d(1 −
δ)β [¯ pd exp(s)+( 1− ¯ pd)exp(−s)] < 1 to guarantee that the discounted value of proﬁts is
ﬁnite. This same logic can be used to show that Ax >A d, Ax is increasing in Πd/Wm,a n d
Ax is decreasing in D.
For the third part of the Lemma, we show that ¯ pd is increasing in Ad.D i ﬀerentiating
(5.3):
∂¯ pd
∂Ad
∂Ad
∂Πd/Wm
=
(1 − δ)
hc00(¯ pd)
β [exp(s) − exp(−s)]
∂Ad
∂Πd/Wm
> 0 ,
where we used
∂Ad
∂Πd/Wm > 0, and the assumption that c00(¯ pd) > 0. The same logic is used to
show that ¯ px is increasing in Πd/Wm and decreasing in D.
10.4. Appendix 4: Solving transition dynamics.
Here we sketch how one can solve for the transition dynamics of our quantitative model in
response to a one time change in trade costs. We consider the case of symmetric countries.
We ﬁrst solve for the steady state value functions V (z), labor l(z,nx) and export ξ(z,nx)
decisions, exit threshold ¯ z, process innovation decisions p(z), measure of ﬁrms M (z),a g g r e -
gate allocations {Y , C, X, Lm,M e}, prices {W, Wm} and proﬁts Πd before and after the
change in international trade costs, as described in Appendix 1.
46We denote by t =1the period in which the trade cost changes to its new value. We
assume that the aggregate allocations and prices converge to the new steady state in T
periods, where T is suﬃciently high so that the resulting allocations are very insensitive
to increasing T. We normalize the price of the ﬁnal good Pt to 1 every period. Then we
implement the following iterative procedure:
1. Guess a sequence of variable domestic proﬁts, research good prices, and interest rates
{Πdt,W mt, Qt+1/Qt}
T−1
t=1 .
2. Solve for the value functions Vt(z) and V o
t (z) from (10.2) and (10.3), with Πt (z) given
by (10.16), and going backwards from t = T − 1 to t =1 . N o t et h a ti no r d e rt o
compute the value function at t = T − 1, we are using the new steady state value
functions to compute the expected future values. Solving these value functions, we
obtain the ﬁrms’ policy functions lt(z,nx), ξt(z,nx), xt(z), ¯ zt,a n dpt (z).
3. Obtain a new guess for the research good prices {Wmt}
T
t=1 using the free entry condition
(2.10), and a sequence of wages as Wt =
h
λ
λ (1 − λ)
1−λ Wmt
i1/λ
.
4. For t =1to T − 1,m o v i n gf o r w a r d :
• Solve for Mt(z) using (10.6), given Mt−1(z), Met−1, and using the ﬁrms’ policy
functions ¯ zt, pt (z) from 2. Note that at t =1 , Mt−1 (z) and Met−1 are given from
the initial steady state.
• Compute Zat, Za∗t from (10.7), and L − Lmt from (10.4), using the ﬁrms’ policy
functions lt (z,nx),x t (z) from 2. and the updated measures Mt (z).
• Compute Xt =( 1− λ)/λLmtWt.
• Solve for Met from (10.5).
• Compute Yt and Ct using (10.17) and (2.11).
5. Using the new values of {Yt,Ct,Wt}
T
t=1, update guesses for Πdt using (10.15), and
Qt+1/Qt = βCt/Ct+1.
6. If the initial and updated guesses for {Πdt,W mt, Qt+1/Qt} are not suﬃciently close,
repeat 1. — 5.
A similar logic can be used to solve for the transition dynamics in the asymmetric small
open economy.
47Table 1: Model Calibration
123
US Data b=3000 b=30 b=10
CALIBRATED PARAMETERS
1      , annualized 0.25 1.25 2.25
2      , annualized 0.0055 0.0055 0.0055
2        (or employment-based right-tail 4.66E+40 4.01E-02 3.57E-01
        coefficient of large firms) ( -0.25 ) ( -0.25 ) ( -0.25 )
4        , annualized 2.3 1.8 0.7
5 0.231 0.231 0.231
6 30 7.9 0.625
7         , annualized 0.6 0.5 0.3
TARGETS
8 Employment growth rate of large firms, 25% 25% 25% 25%
annual standard deviation
9 Annual employment-based exit rate, 0.55% 0.55% 0.55% 0.55%
firms larger 500 employees
10 Employment-based right tail coefficient, -0.2 -0.20 -0.20 -0.26
firms of size 1000 to 5000
11 New firms, % employment of firms smaller 90% 90% 89% 86%
than 500 employees
12 Exports / GDP 7.50% 7.5% 7.5% 7.4%
13 Employment share of exporters 40% 40% 40% 40%
14 Average switching rate, seven years 12% 12% 12% 12%
e
nx
h
D1−
n ̄x
s
            Table 2: Steady state and transition dynamics, 15% increase in exporter's trade intensity
123
Benchmark Model
        Curvature parameter of C(p) b=3000 b=30 b=10
1 Exports / GDP (ratio of new to old SS) 1.22 1.40 2.71
2 Output (ratio of new to old SS) 1.001 1.003 1.019
3 Consumption (ratio of new to old SS) 1.001 1.005 1.033
4 Average productivity index     (ratio of new to old SS) 1.02 1.14 9.07
5 Number of firms  (ratio of new to old SS) 0.99 0.88 0.11
6 Production employment (ratio of new to old SS) 1.000 1.002 1.014
7 Exports / GDP , contemporaneous 0.98 0.54 0.14
increase / SS increase
8 Welfare gain (equivalent variation) 0.36% 0.38% 0.42%
b
z ̃Table 3: Sensitivity Analysis, Steady state and transition dynamics, 15% increase in exporter's trade intensity
123 456 789 1 0 1 1 1 2
Benchmark         Higher trade share Lower substitution elasticity Higher variance of entering firms
      exports / GDP = 0.15
        Curvature parameter of C(p) b=3000 b=30 b=10 b=3000 b=30 b=10 b=3000 b=30 b=10 b=3000 b=30 b=10
1 Exports / GDP (ratio of new to old SS) 1.22 1.40 2.71 1.21 1.33 1.90 1.22 1.40 2.71 1.20 1.33 2.44
2 Output (ratio of new to old SS) 1.001 1.003 1.019 1.004 1.007 1.023 1.006 1.024 1.152 1.002 1.003 1.009
3 Consumption (ratio of new to old SS) 1.001 1.005 1.033 1.004 1.010 1.036 1.006 1.028 1.195 1.002 1.004 1.014
4 Average productivity index    (ratio of new to old SS) 1.02 1.14 9.07 1.04 1.25 60.67 1.02 1.14 9.07 1.02 1.09 3.72
5 Number of firms  (ratio of new to old SS) 0.99 0.88 0.11 0.98 0.82 0.02 0.99 0.89 0.12 0.99 0.92 0.27
6 Production employment (ratio of new to old SS) 1.000 1.002 1.014 1.000 1.002 1.014 1.000 1.005 1.044 1.000 1.001 1.005
7 Exports / GDP , contemporaneous 0.98 0.54 0.14 0.98 0.62 0.25 0.99 0.55 0.14 0.99 0.59 0.14
increase / SS increase
8 Welfare gain (equivalent variation) 0.36% 0.38% 0.42% 0.80% 0.83% 0.92% 1.55% 1.81% 2.22% 0.37% 0.38% 0.40%
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
  Higher share of labor in   Lower share of labor in Process innovation costs scaled      Learning by exporting
  innovation  ,    innovation  ,        by total employment
        Curvature parameter of C(p) b=3000 b=30 b=10 b=3000 b=30 b=10 b=3000 b=30 b=10 b=3000 b=30 b=10
9 Exports / GDP (ratio of new to old SS) 1.22 1.40 2.71 1.22 1.40 2.71 1.22 1.21 1.19 1.22 1.42 2.70
10 Output (ratio of new to old SS) 1.001 1.005 1.032 1.001 1.002 1.011 1.001 1.000 0.999 1.001 1.009 1.076
11 Consumption (ratio of new to old SS) 1.001 1.005 1.033 1.001 1.005 1.032 1.001 1.000 0.999 1.001 1.012 1.120
12 Average productivity index    (ratio of new to old SS) 1.02 1.14 9.07 1.02 1.14 9.07 1.02 1.01 0.98 1.02 1.16 8.61
13 Number of firms  (ratio of new to old SS) 0.985 0.880 0.114 0.986 0.879 0.112 0.99 0.99 1.02 0.99 0.88 0.13
14 Production employment (ratio of new to old SS) 1.000 1.003 1.024 1.000 1.001 1.007 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.004 1.049
15 Exports / GDP , contemporaneous 0.98 0.54 0.14 0.98 0.54 0.14 0.99 1.02 1.23 0.99 0.52 0.12
increase / SS increase
16 Welfare gain (equivalent variation) 0.36% 0.37% 0.40% 0.35% 0.38% 0.42% 0.35% 0.20% 0.07% 0.36% 0.78% 2.23%
b
b
  2
  0.95   0.25
z ̃
z ̃0 20 40 60 80 100 120
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
p
(
z
)
 
(
-
)
Panel A: p(z) and fraction of exporters x(z)
(z-zbar)/s
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
x
(
z
)
 
(
:
)
2 4 6 8 10
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
Panel B: Firm size distribution, employment-based, model (-) and US data 2003 (x)
Log employment
-2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
Panel C: Conditional growth rate, firms of size<100000
Log employment
Figure 1: Steady State, Inelastic Process Innovation (b = 3000)
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Figure 2: Steady State, Moderately Elastic Process Innovation (b = 30)
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Figure 3: Steady State, Highly Elastic Process Innovation (b = 10)
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Figure 4 : Transition Dynamics from a Decline in Marginal Trade Costs
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